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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Partisan Politics that Led to the Spanish-American War 
 
Donald E. Thompson, Jr. 
 
 
This thesis explores how partisan politics played a major role in leading the United 
States into the Spanish-American War. With the unprecedented economic depression 
that began in 1893, many American politicians exploited a rebellion in Cuba to distract 
Americans from their own financial problems. During the administration of Grover 
Cleveland politicians from all political parties supported American intervention in Cuba 
on behalf of the rebels. This show of support for the Cuban rebels by politicians was 
designed to rally the American public around a common cause and highlight the 
difference between them and the unpopular President Cleveland who opposed American 
involvement in Spanish-Cuban affairs.  After the election of William McKinley the 
Cuban rebellion became a partisan issue.  McKinley, who was also opposed to American 
intervention in Cuba, persuaded his fellow Republican leaders to abandon their hostile 
stance on Spain. Democrats and Populists, on the other hand, increased their support for 
the Cuban rebels and used this as a political issue against McKinley and the 
Republicans.  Facing defeat in the upcoming election, Republicans gave in to the call for 
war with Spain. 
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                                                  INTRODUCTION 
  
The Spanish-American War was a dramatic turning point in the history of the 
United States.  With a swift victory over Spain and the acquisition of an overseas 
empire, America assumed the role of a leading world power.  The possession of 
territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific by the United States would drastically shape 
the outcome of world events in the centuries to come.  As Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
would proclaim a year after the cease fire, "The war of the United States with Spain was 
very brief.  Its results were many, startling, and of world-wide meaning."1 The United 
States, like Great Britain, France and other European Nations had become an imperial 
power.  On the home front, the Spanish-American War united Americans around a 
common enemy and helped heal wounds that had divided the country since the Civil 
War.  
 As is the case in any complex series of events, the causes of this war were 
numerous and inextricably intertwined.  Historians have spent more than a hundred 
years now sorting through the evidence in search of the reasons. Traditional 
explanations for the war have focused on Spanish atrocities perpetrated on the Cubans, 
the explosion onboard the battleship Maine and “Yellow Journalism” inciting the 
American public.  Recent emphasis has been placed on America’s imperial ambitions, 
economic interests, gender and cultural reasons.2  Undeniably, all of these are major 
                                                 
1 Henry Cabot Lodge, The War with Spain, (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1899), Preface. 
2 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898. (Ithaca, 
New York, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963); Joseph A. Fry, “Phases of Empire: Late 
Nineteenth-Century U.S. Foreign Relations,” in The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of 
Modern America ed. Charles Calhoun. (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2006);  John L. Offner, An Unwanted War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
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factors to consider in any study of the Spanish-American War.  However, regardless of 
precipitating events, the government of the United States was ultimately responsible for 
the decision to take the country to war.   The role that partisan politics played in this 
decision is usually overlooked.  As historian Ernest May wrote, “In no major episode of 
American history has so little been attributed to the intentions of political leaders and so 
much to forces beyond their control.”3   
This study seeks to reveal the importance of partisan politics in leading the 
United States into a war with Spain. The thesis of this paper is that American 
congressmen exploited a foreign crisis in Cuba for their own political advantage.  Faced 
with a devastating depression that was sweeping the nation, congressmen used a 
rebellion in Cuba to distract Americans from their own economic difficulties.  At first, 
congressmen from all political parties took up the cause of Cuban rebels to garner public 
support and to highlight their differences with an unpopular Democratic President 
Grover Cleveland who opposed American interference in Cuban-Spanish affairs.  Only 
after the election of Republican President William McKinley in 1896 did the Cuban 
rebellion become a politically partisan issue.  Like Cleveland, McKinley was adamantly 
against involving the United States in the intrigues of Cuban affairs.  McKinley opposed 
U.S. involvement in a war that would cost American lives, disrupt international trade 
and frighten the stock market.  He was able to persuade Republicans in Congress to 
abandon their hostile stance on Spain.  Congressional Democrats and Populists, on the 
other hand, sensed the growing public support for American intervention and were 
                                                                                                                                     
1992), Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, 
NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
3 Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (Chicago, Il.: 
Imprint Publications, 1991), 251. 
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determined to parlay their support for the Cuban rebels into victory in the upcoming 
election.  Faced with potential political losses, most Republicans gave in to the demand 
for war and pressured McKinley to intervene in Cuba.  McKinley, who had tried every 
means to negotiate a peaceful settlement that would bring prosperity and stability to 
Cuba, finally succumbed to the political pressure and declared war on Spain.  In doing 
so, McKinley believed that he could unite the political parties behind a common cause.  
But this was not to be the case; as war with Spain began, political partisanship continued 
unabated.   
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     Chapter One 
                         American-Spanish-Cuban Relations: A Context 
 
Tensions had simmered between Spain and the United States over Cuba for 
decades.  The proximity of Cuba to the states, merely ninety miles off the coast of 
Florida, made the island a political chess piece almost from the beginning. Thomas 
Jefferson considered annexing Cuba as early as 1808.  In a letter to President Madison 
the following year, Jefferson made it clear that acquiring the “Pearl of the Antilles” was 
on the distant horizon but took no steps toward formal annexation.1  A common 
presumption among leaders of the time was that an expanding United States would 
inevitably pull Cuba into its orbit.  John Quincy Adams expounded this theory by 
predicting that Cuba, “like an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree would 
gravitate only toward the North American Union.”2 If Adam’s words insinuated a desire 
for a peaceful union between Cuba and the United States, other American leaders called 
for a shotgun wedding.  General Andrew Jackson, facing the Spanish on the Florida 
frontier, declared that if Congress would give him the go ahead and the equipment, 
“Florida shall be in possession of the United States in three months…Cuba in six.”3  
Although Jackson received little additional help by way of Congress, his army’s 
repeated excursions into Florida in pursuit of hostile Indians and runaway slaves finally 
forced Spain to the negotiating table.4  The resulting treaty, drawn up by President James 
                                                 
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Call speaking for the Resolution to Recognize an Independent 
Cuba, S. Res. 405, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 4 December 1895,  Congressional Record, 28: 43.    
2Ibid.  
3 H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times. ( New York, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 2006),  
348. 
4 Ibid.,322-331. 
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Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, required Spain to relinquish Florida 
to the United States and abandon their claim to the Oregon Territory.  In return, the 
United States agreed to pay a monetary settlement and promised to respect the integrity 
of Spain’s other territories: any plans to wrest Cuba away from Spain were put on hold.5  
Spain had surrendered a large chunk of land in North America but in doing so had 
prevented further encroachment by the United States.  With their vulnerable northern 
flank secure, Spain was able to pour its resources into suppressing the ongoing 
rebellions in its other Spanish American colonies.  
The United States, meanwhile, shifted its attention to fulfilling its “Manifest 
Destiny” by conquering and settling the vast western region of America. The dream of a 
coast to coast nation had existed since the days of the Founding Fathers and was no 
doubt shared by the majority of Americans.  The process whereby America would fulfill 
this dream of expansion however, was a contentious point of debate.  Leaders such as 
Jefferson and Adams envisioned a westward expansion that would peacefully extend 
civilization and prosperity to those who were willing to accept a superior way of life.  
As Secretary of State, Adams openly criticized the idea of the United States government 
using force to take territory. On July 4, 1821, Adams addressed Congress to outline his 
vision for America; “[America] goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy...The 
fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force… She 
                                                 
5 Modern History Sourcebook: United States-Spain: Treaty of 1819. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1819florida.html (1998). 
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might become the dictatress of the world: she would be no longer the ruler of her own 
spirit.”6 
Others American leaders, however, such as Jackson and his protégé James K. 
Polk, disagreed with Adams and saw American expansion more as a crusade.  In this 
vision, the “Anglo-Saxon” citizens of the United States were destined to sweep aside the 
Native Americans and other lesser races, by force if necessary, to make way for what 
they viewed as their dominant culture.7 By mid nineteenth century the differences in 
these two visions would collide in the debate leading up to the Mexican-American War.  
Jackson’s Democratic Party, led by President Polk, favored forcefully taking Mexican 
territory while the majority of the Whig Party considered such an act unconstitutional, 
unnecessary and immoral.  In the end, the Democrats won the debate and the United 
States won the war; adding more than 500,000 square miles of territory to the nation.8   
With the westward push to the Pacific nearing completion, the United States 
once again looked south to Cuba.  During the election of 1848, Democratic presidential 
candidate Lewis Cass made it known that if elected he would move to annex Cuba.  The 
Democratic Party, which was becoming an ever more Southern sectional party, saw 
Cuba as a potential slave state that offered economical opportunities as well as free 
labor. No less important, adding Cuba to the slave-holding South would help swing the 
balance of power in Congress to their side.  Northern Whig leaders understood the 
stakes well and decided to nominate an anti-expansionist and popular Mexican-
                                                 
6 John Quincy Adams., Address to Congress on the Fourth of July. (University of Missouri Digital 
Library), 32 http://digital.library.umsystem.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=jul;cc=jul;sid=bf0307d3097042fc4028be768b1fdb12;rgn=full%20text;idno=jul000088;vie
w=image;seq=1  
7 Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, NY.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21. 
8 Joseph Wheelan., Invading Mexico: America’s Continental Dream and the Mexican War, 1846-
1848. (New York, N.Y.: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007),  96-98, 404. 
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American War hero; Zachary Taylor.  This old general from Virginia opposed the 
annexation of Cuba as well as the extension of slavery into the western territories but 
was able to skirt these issues during the campaign and thus win the presidency.9  In 
Taylor’s inaugural address he ignored the slavery issue altogether but made it clear that 
his administration would not engage in any forceful territorial expansion. He anchored 
his position by quoting from Washington’s venerated farewell address which warned of 
entangling alliances with foreign nations and further declared that Christianity directed 
the United States to the “cultivation of peaceful and friendly relationships with all other 
powers.”10  
Undeterred by Washington’s isolationist principles or religious constraints, some 
in the United States decided they would conquer foreign lands with or without the 
government’s permission.  Adventurers and soldiers of fortune organized private armies, 
outfitted seagoing vessels and plotted the hostile takeover of Cuba and other territories.  
These filibustering expeditions were frequently romanticized in American newspapers 
as benevolent acts of “liberation” and were bankrolled by private donations obtained 
through lobbying and rallies.   Many political leaders also lent their support, both tacitly 
and openly.  One of the more noteworthy series of filibustering expeditions was lead by 
Venezuelan native and former Cuban resident: Narciso López.  Claiming to have the 
support of the Cuban people, López was able to recruit between 450 and 600 paid 
soldiers (mostly American men from the Southern states) and position them on Round 
Island off the coast of Mississippi in preparation for invading Cuba.  President Taylor 
                                                 
9 Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, NY.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34. 
10James M. McPherson., To the Best of My Ability. (New York, NY.: DK Publishing Inc., 2005), 
361 
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received information about the impending expedition and ordered a naval blockade of 
the small island.  Surrounded by the US Navy, López was forced to suspend his planned 
invasion of Cuba.  However, López saw this defeat as only a temporary setback and 
within a year he would make another failed attempt to take over Cuba.  Finally in 
August of 1851 López would make his third and last attempt on Cuba.  Within two days 
of landing, López and his army was defeated by a combined force of Spanish regulars 
and armed Cuban citizens.  Captured survivors, including López, were lined up in a 
Havana square and executed.11 
The López incident and other armed forays into Cuba that originated from the 
United States (even though not sanctioned by the United States’ government) took a 
huge toll on Spanish-American relations. For years, Spain had watched with alarm as 
more and more Americans, including political leaders, called for intervention in Cuba.  
Filibustering in Cuba was seen as additional proof that Americans were becoming 
increasingly audacious in their desire to deprive Spain of its last vestiges of empire in 
the New World.  Spanish suspicion that the American government was complicit in 
these armed incursions seemed to be confirmed with the 1852 election of Democrat 
Franklin Pierce as president.  Pierce, who was an ardent supporter of extending slavery 
in the western territories and beyond, did not try to hide his intention of annexing new 
lands.  In his inaugural address he laid out his policy of expansion: 
 
With an experience thus suggestive and cheering, the policy of my Administration 
will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil expansion. Indeed, it is not 
to be disguised that our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render 
the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently 
                                                 
11Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, NY.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005),  181-183. 
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important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of 
the rights of commerce and the peace of the world.12 
 
Pierce’s explicit announcement of an aggressive expansion program offended the 
sensibilities of those Americans who still considered the United States to be a “shinning 
beacon” of freedom to the rest of the world.  Forcefully taking land from weaker nations 
was considered by many to be the ignoble occupation of European colonizers or Oriental 
despots: the United States was founded on higher moral principles.  Nonetheless, within 
a year of taking office, the Pierce administration had persuaded Mexico, by threat of 
force, to sell the United States another significant portion of its northern territory. Called 
the “Gadsden Purchase” after the American ambassador to Mexico, James Gadsden, 
who negotiated the treaty, this treaty added an additional 45,535 square miles to the 
American southwest.13   
Buttressed by this diplomatic victory, President Pierce would next turn his 
attention to an international dilemma that was brewing in Cuba.  In February of 1854, 
Spanish authorities seized a United States’ merchant ship Black Warrior in Havana 
harbor for failure to provide the proper shipping documentation.  Painted as a brazen act 
of Spanish thievery by American newspapers, the ship’s confiscation touched off a 
public clamor for war with Spain.14  President Pierce quickly sent word to his American 
minister at Madrid, Pierre Soule, to deliver the Spanish an explicit ultimatum- Spain had 
forty-eight hours to pay an indemnity of three hundred thousand dollars.15   
                                                 
12 Franklin Nichols., Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills. (Philadelphia, PA.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) 235. 
13 Ibid., 266. and  Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. 
(New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2005),  36. 
14 “Detention and Abandonment of the Black Warrior” New York Times, 10 March 1854, p. 1. 
15 Franklin Nichols., Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills. (Philadelphia, PA.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) 328-329. 
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At the brink of war, Secretary of State William Marcy stepped in and offered the 
Spanish more moderate demands that opened the way for negotiations.16  Spain was 
notorious for “foot-dragging” in any diplomatic bartering with the United States and this 
time would be no exception. An impatient Pierce soon grew frustrated with what he 
perceived as stalling by Spain and decided to use the same strong-arm tactics that had 
succeeded in Mexico.  He directed Minister Soule to confer with the American Ministers 
to France and England in order to devise a plan to take Cuba from Spain.  This plan, 
which would be called the “Ostend Manifesto” after the town in Belgium where the 
three ministers wrote it, declared; “Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic 
as any of its present members.”  Furthermore, the ministers recommended offering Spain 
one hundred and twenty million dollars for the island.  If this offer were rejected then 
the United States would be “justified” in taking Cuba by force.17   
Although this document was sent to the State Department as a confidential 
dispatch, word of its content was soon leaked to American newspapers.  A fickle 
American public that had condoned or tolerated annexing Mexican territory months 
earlier in the Gadsden Purchase reacted differently to this blatant land grab in the 
Caribbean. Many Americans, especially anti-slavery Northerners, denounced this plan as 
a government-sanctioned act of piracy.  Bending to the public backlash, President Pierce 
disavowed the document and accepted Minister Soule’s resignation.18  Pierce’s dream of 
extending the American empire beyond the shoreline had been strangled in its cradle.  
Even so, one of the Ostend Manifesto’s authors, former minister to England, James 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 330. 
17 Ibid., 367-371 
18 Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, 
NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2005),  36-38. 
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Buchanan, would be elected the next president.  Like Pierce, Buchanan was a pro-
expansionist; but tensions between the North and South over the slavery issue would 
eclipse all international concerns during his term in office.  Before Buchanan was out of 
office seven Southern states would secede from the union and the incoming (and first) 
Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, would confront a bloody civil war that 
threatened the existence of the United States. 
With the United States occupied with a civil war, Spain took the opportunity to 
send its military to the Caribbean once again to re-occupy the island nation of Santo 
Domingo.  Pedro Santana, the Dominican president, had requested Spanish intervention 
but the citizens of the island soon rebelled and within two years the Spanish were forced 
to annul the annexation.  Although the rebellion succeeded in permanently expelling 
Spain from Santo Domingo, the financial costs of waging war bankrupted the small 
nation’s weak economy.   In 1869, drowning in debt, the new government of Santo 
Domingo decided to negotiate a treaty for the annexation of their country to the United 
States for one and a half million dollars.  The current President of the United States, 
Ulysses S. Grant, was dealing with the aftermath of his own war yet nevertheless was 
enthusiastic about the prospect of buying a foothold in the Caribbean. The Congress, 
however, was less excited about obtaining a troubled island nation that presented all 
sorts of potential problems.  After a lengthy consideration in the Senate the treaty was 
ten votes short of ratification.19 
This debate over annexing Santo Domingo foreshadowed the anti-imperialism 
arguments that would be heard in the wake of the Spanish-American war.  Those 
                                                 
19 Allan Nevins., Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (Binghamton, 
N.Y.: Vail-Ballou, Inc., 1936), 249-278. 
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Republicans who opposed the treaty argued that it was unconstitutional to annex non-
adjacent mainland territory.  Republicans, such as the reformer, Carl Schurz, also argued 
that the non-white peoples of the Caribbean were unfit for a democratic government and 
would become a burden on the country.  Democrats, who held only twelve seats in the 
Senate, also argued against the treaty on racial grounds: Santo Domingo would become 
a “black state” whose citizens would gain voting rights and a free pass to migrate to the 
continental United States.20 Besides the race issue, Democrats were also wary of any 
foreign adventure or territorial conquest that might potentially strengthen the federal 
government or increase the import of agricultural products that could compete with their 
own local produce.21   This, of course, was a complete reversal of their antebellum 
support for conquering new territory. 
Spain had likewise opposed the treaty that would have given its former colony to 
the United States.  Among many reasons, Spain feared the United States would be 
tempted to annex Cuba next.  Unrest on Cuba had indeed escalated into open warfare by 
1868 and the American public was watching closely as the war unfolded.  President 
Ulysses S. Grant’s administration did not support either side in the conflict but many 
private filibuster expeditions launched from the United States began shipping arms and 
other supplies to the Cuban rebels. As before, these filibusters were often given a wink 
and a nod by local officials and celebrated in newspapers.22   
                                                 
20 Ibid., 316-321. 
21Joseph A. Fry, “Phases of Empire: Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Foreign Relations,” in The 
Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America ed. Charles Calhoun. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 312. 
22 Allan Nevins., Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (Binghamton, 
N.Y.: Vail-Ballou, Inc., 1936), 176-180. 
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On October 31, 1873 a Cuban gunrunning boat named the Virginius, captained 
by a former American naval officer Joseph Fry and falsely flying a United States flag, 
was captured by the Spanish off the coast of Jamaica. The ship’s contents of arms and 
ammunition were confiscated and the captain and crew were taken back to Cuba for 
trial.  Despite an outcry of international condemnation, Fry and fifty three of his men 
and passengers were found guilty of piracy and executed.23  American newspapers 
reported that several of the sailors were decapitated and their heads placed on pikes and 
marched through the streets.  An outraged American public once again called for 
military action against Spain.24  
 President Grant responded with sympathy for the executed Americans but was 
not prepared to take military action against Spain.  The United States army was still 
overseeing reconstruction in the South and was ill-prepared to begin a foreign conflict 
over dubious reasons.25  Besides, President Grant was also coping with a deep economic 
depression in the United States and was reluctant to add to the mounting national debt.  
Spain also signaled a willingness to make amends for the Virginius incident and began 
working out an agreement with Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to pay an indemnity to 
the families of the executed sailors.  In addition, the Spanish government agreed to 
surrender the Virginius and the surviving crew and passengers to an American warship 
and salute the American flag.  During the negotiations Grant also offered to purchase the 
                                                 
23 “The Virginius,” New York Times, 7 November 1873, p. 7. 
24 “Reported Barbarities of the Spaniards- The Head of the Executed Carried on Pikes” New York 
Times, 18 November 1873, p. 1. 
25 U.S., Congress, House, Congressman Mason  speaking on Senate Resolution to provide for the 
Twelfth and subsequent census, S. Res. 94, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 9 February 1898, Congressional 
Record, , 31: 1580. 
 14
troubled island from Spain.26  The offer was rejected by Spanish officials and 
afterwards, Secretary Fish maneuvered to stall any further attempts by the government 
to annex Cuba.27  Fish’s opposition to making Cuba a state mirrored the racial 
arguments heard in the debates over acquiring Santo Domingo.28 
 While American and Spanish leaders debated the fate of Cuba, the rebels 
continued their war for independence.  For ten years the rebels struggled persistently yet 
unsuccessfully against a superior Spanish army. The rebellion finally ended in 1878 
after Spain promised a series of limited political reforms.  Negotiating out of necessity 
and with limited help from abroad, the beleaguered rebels accepted the Spanish terms. 
Unfortunately, the promised reforms never fully materialized and life improved little for 
the inhabitants of the island.   
Dismayed at the lack of reforms, thousands of these war-weary Cubans made 
their way to the United States and began rebuilding their lives.  Many still harbored the 
dream of an independent homeland but understood the need to have American support in 
any future attempt at revolution.  Cuban expatriate leaders, many whom were veterans 
of the late war, began working within the Cuban communities across America to enlist 
members and collect funds and supplies for a second revolution.  These revolutionary 
leaders also created a lobbyist organization, known as the “Cuban Junta” that worked to 
gain support from American politicians, newspapers and the public for liberating 
                                                 
26 Allan Nevins., Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration. (Binghamton, 
N.Y.: Vail-Ballou, Inc., 1936), 687, 192-193. 
27 Ibid., Ironically, it would be Fish’s grandson and namesake who would become the first 
American soldier killed in the Spanish-American War. 
28 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898. 
(Ithaca, New York, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963),  32. 
 15
Cuba.29  Even though the Junta was partially successful in this effort, the American 
government was not yet ready to take up the cause of “Cuba Libre.” Cubans would have 
to wait until the end of the nineteenth century before the foreign policy of the United 
States would shift in their favor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
29 G.J.A. O’Toole, The Spanish War: An American Epic 1898. (New York, NY., W.W. Norton & 
Company Inc, 1984),  47-49. 
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 Chapter Two 
                       Cuba and the Cleveland Administration  
 
During the 1890s American foreign policy would transition from a 
Western-hemisphere focused policy and restrained post-bellum attitude to a more 
aggressive global strategy.  Prompting this policy shift were the rapidly changing 
economical realities of the late nineteenth century.  The United States had 
emerged during this period as one of the world’s leading industrial nation and 
foreign markets were becoming increasingly important for continued growth.1  In 
order to open up these new markets for trade the United States had to reach out 
and engage the world as never before.  This unprecedented assertion into global 
affairs would present many new challenges to American leaders and breathe new 
life into the perennial debate over territorial expansion. 
Many, if not most, of America’s leaders at this time favored a foreign 
policy that promoted a “commercial expansion” whereby the United States would 
access global markets through such benign methods as reciprocal trade 
agreements and leasing foreign coaling stations.2  A new generation of leaders, 
however, believed that the United States’ new position as a world power required 
a more aggressive policy toward its global neighbors. These leaders, such as 
Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, were part of an imperialist 
movement that called for the United States to abandon its restrained foreign 
                                                 
1  H.W. Brands, The Reckless Decade: America in the 1890s (Chicago, Il.:The University of 
Chicago Press, Ltd., 1995), 39. 
2 William McKinley’s Address to the National Association of Manufacturers, 27 January 1898, 
McKinley Papers, Reel 60.; Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American 
Empire. (New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2005),  17. 
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policy and compete with the European powers in territorial conquests.3  Evidence 
that this movement was gaining influence came in January of 1893 when a group 
of American and European citizens, with the help of U.S. Marines, overthrew the 
queen of Hawaii and established a provisional government on the Central Pacific 
islands. Afterwards they began negotiations to be annexed to the United States.4  
President Benjamin Harrison accepted the request but his term in office expired 
before he could push the treaty through Congress. The incoming Democratic 
President, Grover Cleveland immediately withdrew the treaty after taking office.5 
President Cleveland had defeated Harrison in the election of 1892 mainly 
by promising lower tariffs and other governmental reforms but was also 
notoriously opposed to territorial expansion or any semblance of imperialism. 
Cleveland was determined to maintain a cautious and conservative foreign policy 
much like Washington had envisioned in his celebrated farewell address.   
However, soon after Cleveland took office an economic crisis overshadowed all 
international concerns.  This financial disaster, later called the “Panic of 1893,” 
would develop into the worst economic depression in the country’s history to that 
point.   
Historians and economists offer many different theories on what exactly 
caused the depression but most agree that the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 
1890 greatly exacerbated the problem.  This act, designed to support Western 
silver mining interests, mandated the U.S. Treasury buy a certain amount of silver 
each month with bank notes that could be redeemed for either silver or gold.  
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During the panic numerous investors rushed to cash in their silver notes for gold, 
thus depleting the federal gold reserves.  Cleveland had strongly opposed the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act even before it was enacted but was nonetheless 
blamed for the resulting economic storm.6 Reacting promptly, Cleveland called 
for an emergency congressional session to repel the act.  The measure passed but 
the economic freefall continued.  
In the wake of the Panic of 1893 thousands of companies across America 
went out of business, farmers were devastated by falling crop prices, numerous 
railroads went bankrupt, and more than six hundred banks closed.7  The 
unemployment rate soared to between twelve and eighteen percent and many 
workers who remained employed saw their wages cut drastically.8  Production of 
bituminous coal almost completely halted when one hundred and eighty thousand 
miners went on strike.9 This unprecedented instability in American society caused 
public confusion and disillusionment in national leaders.   
         The nation appeared to be on the verge of an open insurrection by March of 
1894 when a populist leader, Jacob S. Coxey, organized hundreds of unemployed 
workers from Ohio and Pennsylvania into an “army” and set out on a peaceful 
march to Washington D.C. to demand federal relief.  Passing through towns on its 
way east, Coxey’s army was met by thousands of cheering well wishers who lined 
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the streets to witness the spectacle.10  Following in Coxey’s footsteps, thousands 
of more citizens from around the country formed into their own battalions to 
advance on the capital.  This mass movement turned into chaos as several of these 
Coxey-type armies seized freight trains and rioted in the streets.11 
Newspapers generally downplayed the seriousness of these armies, 
portraying the marchers as bands of tramps and cranks more concerned with 
begging for hand-outs than fomenting a revolution. Some in the press, however, 
saw the Coxey movement as symptomatic of a growing problem. The Economist 
newspaper reported that “The greatest industrial struggle ever begun in this 
country, if not in the world, is in progress here.”12  The London Chronicle 
similarly predicted that “coxeyism” would eventually escalate into a full blown 
civil war that would be “almost as serious as that which arose from slavery.”13   
Meeting these challenges vigorously, the Cleveland Administration 
dispatched federal troops to no less than fourteen states to assist local authorities 
in confronting the marchers.  In the capital, the War Department delivered 
hundreds of small arms and repeating rifles to the Treasury Department in 
anticipation of Coxey’s arrival. The local police force also beefed up their patrols 
and began arresting suspicious-looking strangers.14 Members of Congress were 
divided over how to respond to the approaching armies. Many congressmen, 
especially from the Western states, expressed support for these unemployed 
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workers whom they believed had full entitlement to stage peaceful 
demonstrations.  Other congressmen predicted the Coxey movement was destined 
to descend into chaos and widespread bloodshed.  Nevada Republican William M. 
Stewart wrote to Coxey to implore him to suspend his march and instead express 
his grievances with a ballot in the upcoming November election.  Stewart 
cautioned Coxey that marching on Washington would only give President 
Cleveland a pretext to strengthen the federal government and suppress other 
oppositional voices.15 
Undeterred by any warnings, Coxey and his army finally arrived in 
Washington D.C. on May 1st 1894.  Forming a flamboyant parade, complete with 
banners and a brass band, Coxey’s followers marched down Pennsylvania Avenue 
to the capitol building. As thousands of spectators crowded to witness the scene, 
Coxey was arrested and hustled off without much resistance. The rest of his 
followers were likewise arrested or dispersed by club-wielding policemen.16 The 
other industrial armies around the country met similar fates as federal troops 
apprehended their leaders and forced the demonstrators to disband. 
Less than two weeks after Coxey’s arrest, three thousand workers at the 
Pullman Palace Car Company in Illinois went on strike.17  The American Railway 
Union, lead by Eugene V. Debs, supported the strike and organized a nation-wide 
boycott of trains hauling Pullman cars and effectively  closed down all traffic 
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west of Chicago.18 President Cleveland once again reacted forcefully by ordering 
Federal Marshals and some twelve thousand United States Army troops to break 
up the strikes and restore service to the railroads. These heavy-handed tactics of 
Cleveland caused an outrage among much of the American public.  Politically 
savvy Republicans, Populists and Democrats denounced these drastic measures 
and scrambled to distance themselves from the President. 19 
Unfortunately for the Democrats, the public’s anger at Cleveland and the 
continued economic crisis manifested itself in the off-year election of 1894 as 
voters turned strongly against them.  Suffering the worst defeat in their history, 
the Democratic Party lost every congressional race outside the South.  Prior to this 
election, the Democrats had enjoyed a majority in the House and Senate, now 
they had lost both.  In the House alone they gave up one hundred and twenty-five 
seats and were now the minority with only ninety three members as opposed to 
two hundred and fifty-four Republicans.20  Faced with these unprecedented 
electoral losses, the Democratic Party struggled to maintain itself as a viable 
political force.  Experienced Democratic politicians understood that if the party 
were to succeed in the future it needed to focus on popular issues that would 
attract former Democratic voters back into the fold.  One issue that had 
historically proven successful in rallying the public behind their leaders and 
distracting them from domestic problems was a foreign crisis.  Evidence that 
some political strategists were weighing the benefits of a foreign crisis can be 
found in the words of one prominent Democrat, Fitzhugh Lee, who advised 
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Cleveland; “(war) might do much toward directing the minds of the people away 
from imaginary ills.”21  Nonetheless, Cleveland stubbornly refused to fall prey to 
the siren song of jingoism. 
 However, the opportunity for Congress to exploit an international crisis would 
come in early 1895 when war once again broke out in Cuba.  This renewed war for 
independence, like the Democrat’s political headaches, stemmed from the financial 
meltdown in the United States. Thousands of Cuban émigrés in New York and Florida 
had lost their jobs after the Panic of 1893 and these idle workers were recruited by the 
Cuban Junta to form a new revolutionary army and return to their homeland. Also, the 
American depression had severely inflicted the Cuban economy and poverty-stricken 
citizens on the island were ready for a revolution.  The first battle of the “Cuban War for 
Independence” occurred in February 24, 1895 when a small band of Cuban rebels 
attacked a detachment of Spanish soldiers in the village of Baire, Cuba. This minor 
skirmish in the Cuban jungle was a military defeat for the out-gunned rebels but it 
succeeded in arousing the excitement of politicians in Washington, D.C.  
The next day, members of the United States’ Senate offered their support for 
Cuban liberation and Florida Democratic Senator Wilkinson Call submitted a resolution 
demanding the Spanish government release a captured rebel, Antonio Maximo Mora, 
who held American as well as Cuban citizenship.22 In an age when international 
communication systems were relatively limited and erratic, it is remarkable that details 
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of this first battle, in a small Cuban village, could reach Washington D.C. so quickly.23 
The prompt transmission of this information can be credited to the efficiency of the 
Cuban Junta which was working closely with some members of Congress. Senator Call, 
who had submitted this first resolution, had especially close ties with the Junta.  His 
state of Florida was home to many Cuban-Americans and his son was employed by the 
Junta to raise funds for their cause.24 
  Later that week, as hostilities on the island increased, the Senate discussed 
Spanish brutalities against innocent civilians and submitted legislation to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations that condemned Spanish authorities for imprisoning two more 
Cuban citizens holding American passports.25  The following month another incident 
occurred in Cuban waters that electrified members of Congress.  The Spanish navy, on 
patrol for gunrunners, fired a warning shot over the bow of an American mail ship, the 
Alliança, that was steaming off the eastern coast of Cuba.26  Infuriated congressmen 
took the podium once again to rebuke the “treacherous Spaniards” for this attack on 
innocent Americans.   Democrat Senator from Alabama, John T. Morgan demanded 
President Cleveland to “…dispatch a fleet of warships to Havana.”  Continuing the war 
cry, Republican Shelby Cullom of Illinois angrily proclaimed “it is time someone woke 
up and realized the necessity of annexing more property.” The New York Tribune 
reported the next day “The outrage (by Senators) would not have been more flagrant if 
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they (the Spanish) had entered the harbor of New York and bombarded the City Hall.” 27 
Indeed, this early saber-rattling by members of both major parties in the United States 
was an overreaction but would be characteristic of the dialogue in Congress for the next 
several years. 
 Contrary to the stir in Congress, the major newspapers in America gave little 
attention to this new outbreak of rebellion in Cuba. The New York Times reported on 
page five that a revolution in Cuba was a “matter of fiction,” and that the incident in the 
village of Baire was nothing more than “rioters” who wished to complain to the local 
governor.28 Other media outlets depicted the rebellion as just another in a long line of 
periodic revolts.29  This disputes the myth that aggressive congressmen were only 
reacting to pressure from sensationalist newspapers’ accounts of the Spanish atrocities in 
Cuba.  An explanation that is now routinely offered by historians is that competition 
between newspapers, William Randolph Hearst’s Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’ World in 
particular, caused the Spanish-American war.  Often quoted is Hearst’s telegraph to 
Cuban correspondent Frederic Remington; “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the 
war.”30  The fact is- Hearst did not begin publishing the Journal until seven months after 
the rebellion began.  Likewise, Pulitzer’s World did not print its first insurgent-
sympathetic editorial until nearly a month after the first anti-Spanish discourse in 
Congress.  In this era, the majority of newspapers in the United States were mouthpieces 
for one political party or another.  These papers were no exception.  Pulitzer and Hearst 
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were both well-known supporters of Democratic causes.  Hearst was the son a 
Democratic Congressman and would later parlay his fame as a newspaper editor into his 
own political career.31  It is certain, however, that horrific accounts of atrocities in Cuba 
contributed to an increase in newspaper sales, but many of these headlines were 
provided by the politicians themselves.  
In the weeks after the Alliança affair, Congressmen continued to speak out in 
condemnation of Spain.  In several states, Congressmen organized mass rallies and 
patriotic fundraisers in honor of the Cuban rebels.32 President Cleveland, who was a 
stubborn enemy of jingoism, watched the antics of these leaders with growing alarm.33 
In a stern address to Congress, the President stressed the obligation of the United States 
government to recognize Spanish sovereignty in Cuba and condemned filibustering 
expeditions originating from the United States.34  In regards to the Alliança incident, 
Cleveland made it clear that he intended to give the Spanish government sufficient time 
to apologize and did not want to provoke them unnecessarily.35 To Spain, Cleveland sent 
word via Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham to demand of the government “…a 
prompt disavowal of the unauthorized act and due expression of regret” and warned that 
future interference with American shipping would not be tolerated.36   
 As Cleveland waited for his demands to be met, another Latin American crisis 
took center stage in America. This dispute concerned the border region between 
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Venezuela and British Guyana in South America.  The disagreement stemmed from the 
discovery of gold in this area (and control of the Orinoco River, gateway to South 
America) and leaders of both countries claimed to own the territory. Worried that the 
superior British military was poised to seize the land, Venezuela petitioned the United 
States for assistance on the grounds that this was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Relations, P. Ezequiel Rojas sent word to Secretary of 
State Walter Gresham that his country regarded the United States as “a nation that is 
called upon to watch over the political and territorial integrity of the other American 
peoples.”37  This Venezuelan recognition of the Monroe Doctrine was considered by 
many as further evidence of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  In a 
widely-read article, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts 
condemned the “territorial aggression” of the British and reminded the government of its 
responsibility to prevent European imperialism in Latin America.38 
Members of Congress salivated over this opportunity to stir up Americans’ latent 
animosity toward its old nemesis; Great Britain.  The well-regarded  North American 
Review reported that Democrats had been eager to use the Venezuelan border dispute as 
a “new plank for their national platform” and the Republican Party likewise “derived its 
fair share of public approbation from the incident.”39 Texas Democratic Congressman 
Thomas Paschal was even more candid in his appraisal of the possible political benefits 
of this crisis; “Turn this Venezuelan question up or down, North, South, East or West, 
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and it’s a winner,” he confessed to the newly-appointed Secretary of State, Richard 
Olney.40  Continuing, Paschal compared anarchists, socialists and populists to an 
outbreak of boils on the “political surface” of America and exclaimed “One cannon shot 
across the bow of a British boat in defense of this principle [the Monroe Doctrine] will 
knock more pus out of it than would suffice to inoculate and corrupt our people for the 
next two years.”41 In another letter to Olney, George P. Ikirt, the campaign manager of 
the Ohio Democratic gubernatorial nominee, pleaded for “a little jingo” against Great 
Britain to help turn out the vote for his candidate in the upcoming election.42 
To the surprise of many, President Cleveland agreed to confront Great Britain.  
Without consulting Venezuela, Cleveland directed Secretary of State Olney to send a 
strongly-worded message to the British demanding they submit to American arbitration.  
When the British initially refused to comply, Cleveland asked Congress for 
authorization to appoint a boundary commission and proposed that the commission’s 
findings be enforced "by every means." This thinly-veiled threat of war against one of 
the greatest military superpowers in the world quickly became the hot topic of national 
and international newspapers.43 Congress unanimously passed the measure and Olney 
sent another letter to the British reiterating America’s firm stance.44 British leaders 
cautiously studied their options and decided against creating another enemy at this 
precarious juncture. Faced with numerous difficulties in managing their global empire 
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and the growing threat from Germany, Britain reluctantly accepted American arbitration 
in the border dispute and tensions eased.45   
 President Cleveland had temporarily won the approval of the American public 
and politicians.  Letters filled with congratulation and patriotic passion flooded the 
Executive Mansion. Theodore Roosevelt, currently serving as President of the New 
York City Police Commissioners, wrote Cleveland to thank him “with all my heart as an 
American,” for his success in Venezuela.46 Some historians, such as Walter Karp, 
believe this episode in foreign diplomacy proved Cleveland had succumbed to political 
pressures and was trying to garner the people’s support by taking a firm position against 
the British.47  Yet, a close study of Cleveland’s prior opposition to any form of 
imperialism, demonstrates this stance on the Venezuelan border issue followed 
precedent.  For Cleveland, the British threat of taking Venezuelan land by force did 
indeed represent a violation of the Monroe Doctrine; to ignore this affront would be a 
sign of American weakness.  Cleveland was also well aware that European countries had 
recently contemplated expanding their imperial empires into Latin America.48 In his 
Annual Address, Cleveland pointed out past incursions by European powers into Latin 
America and suggested that the threat of additional territorial expansion was becoming 
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ever more tempting to imperialist nations.49  This strong stance against British 
aggression in Venezuela would be a powerful warning to all the European powers.   
 Regardless of Cleveland’s motivation, many members of Congress interpreted 
this diplomatic victory as proof that America had entered the pantheon of great nations.  
Reveling in its success, Congress reconvened in December with a renewed confidence in 
the United States’ ability to facilitate Cuban independence.  Several resolutions 
addressing the Cuban question were submitted to the House Foreign Affairs and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration.  The first to make it to the full 
Senate on January 28, 1896 was a resolution by Democrat Senator John T. Morgan that 
granted belligerent rights to the Cuban insurgents.  The second resolution to be debated, 
offered by Republican Senator Don Cameron, requested the President to work with 
Spain “…for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.”50  Both of these measures, 
which were later combined as the Morgan-Cameron resolution, were concurrent or 
“non-binding” and required no executive action.   
 Amid the deliberation on these resolutions, a series of events in Cuba intensified 
the debate.  First, the infamous Captain-General Valeriano Weyler replaced the 
ineffective Spanish head of the military forces in Cuba, General Arsenio Martínez 
Campos.  Already well known in the United States for his brutal military tactics during 
the Ten Year War, Weyler was given full power by the Spanish government to take 
whatever drastic measures were necessary to quash the rebellion.51 Weyler, dubbed “The 
Butcher,” and the “modern imitator of Cortez” by newspaper reporters, would soon live 
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up to his nickname.  He began a program of forced concentration (called 
“reconcentrado” by insurgents and the American press) whereby four hundred thousand 
men, women and children would eventually be herded together into camps lacking 
proper sanitation and provisions.  Consequently, thousands of Cuban civilians began 
dying of starvation and disease.52  
  After word of Weyler’s arrival reached Washington, congressional debate on the 
Morgan-Cameron Resolution focused on the brutality of the Spanish military and the 
need to protect American citizens and property in Cuba.  Displaying patriotic fervor, 
proponents of the resolution argued for the use of the American military to end these 
atrocities in Cuba and force Spain out of the Western Hemisphere.  One exceptional 
exhibition of political theater by Democrat Senator, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, was 
featured in the next edition of the New York Times.  The heading for the story was “Mills 
Shouts For War: The Excited Texan Calls For Armed Intervention In Cuba.”  The story 
in part read; “Mr. Mills grabbed a sword… and began to strike down on the oppressors 
of Cuba regardless of consequences to himself, without pity for his neighboring 
Senators… Not since the jingoes made their first imperious onset for war with Spain to 
secure the freedom of Cuba has the Senate witnessed another savage attack like Mills’ 
upon Spain.”53 
Opposition to the Morgan-Cameron Resolution, led by Republican Senators George 
Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts and Eugene Pryor Hale of Maine, accused supporters of 
the bill of engineering a foreign crisis for political gains.  In one particularly heated 
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exchange in March, Senator Hale accused Ohio Republican John Sherman of using false 
and inflammatory accounts of the Cuban war to build himself up for a presidential bid.54  
Hale also condemned the Cubans for their unscrupulous methods in warfare and for 
wantonly destroying American property on the island. Other arguments against a more 
aggressive stance on Cuba questioned the constitutionality of congressional recognition 
of belligerency rights and pointed out that the resolution was non-binding and therefore 
meaningless. 55  
 Despite the opposition, the Morgan-Cameron Resolution passed both the House 
and Senate with bi-partisan support.  The Senate vote was 64 to six with 10 abstentions, 
while the House vote was 247 to 27 with 80 abstentions.56  The overwhelming support 
of this legislation was significant in that it legitimized in the minds of the public, the 
right of America to intervene in Cuba if necessary.  But, considering these resolutions 
were non-binding, they were more posturing than an effective plan to solve the problem.  
Both houses of Congress knew it was unlikely President Cleveland would follow the 
recommendation of these resolutions.  Cleveland had already made it known he believed 
in Spanish sovereignty in Cuba.  In an election year, however, supporting anti-Spanish 
resolutions became an effective means for congressmen to highlight their differences 
with an unpopular president. 
 Once the presidential campaign of 1896 got under way, the Cuban war faded into 
the back pages of the newspapers.  The two major candidates, Republican William 
McKinley and Democrat (and Populist) William Jennings Bryan, came out in support of 
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the Cubans, so there was little mention of the topic on the campaign trail.57  However, 
the Republican, Democrat and Populist platforms all included planks expressing 
sympathy with the Cubans and called for their independence.  The Republican platform 
plank concerning Cuba, which would become the topic of much debate in the year to 
come, called for an end to Spanish oppression and concluded with; “…we believe that 
the Government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices 
to restore peace and give independence to the island.”58  Constructed with ambiguous 
language, the Republican plank on Cuba was designed to be sympathetic yet 
noncommittal. Democrats would later interpret the wording differently and accuse the 
Republicans of abandoning their pledge to “liberate” the Cubans. 
 Although all political parties played lip service to the cause of the Cuban rebels, 
the prominent issue in the 1896 presidential campaign was whether the monetary 
standard in America would be based on gold or a combination of gold and silver 
(bimetallism). McKinley’s campaign lobbied big business and major banks to finance 
his campaign.59  Using the threat of bimetallism to frighten Eastern businessmen who 
championed the gold standard, McKinley collected a record three and a half million 
dollars for his campaign.60  Bryan, who was nominated by both the Democratic and 
Populist parties, attracted widespread support among Southern and Western voters and 
helped unite the fractured Democratic base. In the end though, big money led to a 
McKinley victory. In spite of the Republicans taking the top spot, Democrats did 
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manage substantial gains in both the House and Senate but fell short of the majority in 
both. The Democratic strategy of distancing themselves from Cleveland was only a 
partial success.   
 With the election over, newspapers once again began devoting substantial space 
to the Cuban insurgency.  In the days preceding McKinley’s inauguration, a new round 
of debates over the situation in Cuban was suddenly sparked by an event on the island. 
Pro-independence Cuban General, Antonio Maceo, who had been portrayed in 
congressional speeches as a courageous “George Washington” figure, was killed in a 
battle on December 7, 1896.  Through newspaper editorials, Maceo had become a 
romantic figure to Americans who followed his heroic defiance against his Spanish 
adversaries.  When word of Maceo’s death reached America it was erroneously reported 
that the Spaniards had treacherously murdered him during truce negotiations.61  This 
fictitious report was probably manufactured by the Cuban Junta (See pages 22-23) but 
was cited as fact by members of Congress. Consequently, demonstrations demanding the 
liberation of Cuba were held in Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Chicago, 
Memphis, St. Louis and numerous other small towns across America.62 Congressmen 
were also flooded with pro-Cuban petitions containing thousands of signatures from 
their constituents.  This public indignation that Congress had carefully nurtured for 
political benefit was now becoming unmanageable.   
 On the day of General Maceo’s death, President Cleveland sent a message to 
Congress that cautioned Congress against taking the United States down a dangerous 
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path toward war.  He also warned Congress against taking any action to recognize the 
belligerency of the Cuban insurgents. He argued that according to the principles of 
international law the circumstances that justify a neutral nation recognizing insurgent 
belligerency had not been met in Cuba. Cleveland explained that before a revolting 
community can be recognized they need to establish a functioning government.  The 
Cuban insurgents had failed in this regard, as Cleveland pointed out; “…at the demand 
of the commander-in-chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban government has 
now given up all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that government confessedly 
(what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact), a government 
merely on paper”63   
 Ignoring Cleveland’s message, on December 21, 1896, Senator Cameron re-
submitted his resolution calling for Cuban independence.  This time it was submitted as 
a joint resolution (binding) and required action from Cleveland. 64    The lawmakers’ 
plan was to pass the resolution overwhelmingly, send it to Cleveland, allow him to veto 
it, and then override it into law.  However, Secretary of State Richard Olney (directed by 
Cleveland) held a press conference to address the resolution.  Olney announced that 
even if Congress passed the resolution over Cleveland’s veto it would not be acted upon.  
He argued that the power to recognize a state rested exclusively with the executive 
branch of government and furthermore if any resolution on the subject were passed it 
would be “important only as advice of great weight, voluntarily tendered to the 
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Executive, regarding the manner in which he shall exercise his Constitutional 
functions.”65  
 Jingo congressmen were livid with Olney’s announcement and talk of 
impeachment was heard in the following debates.  New Hampshire Republican Senator 
William E. Chandler fumed over Cleveland’s defiance of Congress; “It is worse than 
that of Andrew Johnson.  The only trouble is that if we were to pass it over the veto, and 
Mr. Cleveland should refuse to execute the law, there would be no time to impeach him. 
Thank God, however, we will not have him in the Executive Mansion after March the 
Fourth.” 66  Following suit, Democratic Senator John T. Morgan accused Cleveland of 
being a dictator; “If the president has the power to disregard a law enacted by Congress 
over his veto, we have ceased to live in a land of laws and have found in our presidential 
office a power that is not pretended to by any monarch that exists in the world.”67 Other 
Senators chimed in with similar complaints but Cleveland had succeeded in changing 
the issue to a debate over the constitutional powers of the executive and legislative 
branches of government.  The resolution on Cuba’s independence was in effect dead as 
Congress retired for winter’s recess. 
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               Chapter Three 
                                     Cuba: A Political Football 
 
In the closing weeks of Cleveland’s presidency public sentiment continued to be 
aroused by fresh reports of American citizens being murdered, mistreated and 
imprisoned in Cuba.  William McKinley could only hope to have the problem solved 
before he took the presidential oath. The incoming president was against sending 
American men into armed conflict with Spain on humanitarian as well as economic 
grounds.  McKinley had served as a Union volunteer in the Civil War and had been 
decorated for bravery under fire at the Battle of Antietam.  This Civil War confrontation, 
which would be the bloodiest single-day battle in the history of the United States, left a 
deep impression on the young soldier.1  
  Apart from these reservations, McKinley was also strongly aligned with the 
business community which believed a war would have a negative impact on the nation’s 
economy.  McKinley had been the darling of the business community since his days as 
an Ohioan congressman in the House of Representatives.  In this position, the future 
president had authored the pro-business “McKinley Tariff” of 1890 which protected 
domestic industries by increasing the tariff on foreign products.2  Business leaders 
returned the favor in 1891 by backing McKinley in his successful campaign for 
governor of Ohio.  One of his supporters, Ohio millionaire-businessman Marcus Hanna, 
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would become McKinley’s most trusted friend and political advisor.3  In 1893 when 
McKinley went bankrupt and creditors seized his property, it was Hanna along with 
other businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie and Henry C. Frick who bailed the 
governor out of debt.4   
 In the 1896 presidential race the business community once again rallied in 
support of McKinley.  Among others, America’s economic triumvirate of the Gilded 
Age; J.P Morgan, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie rewarded the Republican 
candidate with handsome donations.5 These three powerful tycoons, as well as most of 
the business community openly expressed to McKinley their aversion to war with 
Spain.6 Industrialists believed a foreign war would severely disrupt business as usual.  
Businessmen preferred the growing domestic market over foreign outlets; but when they 
did trade overseas, the lions’ share (92.5 percent) went to Europe or European 
Dominions.7  A war with a European power (even though Spain accounted for only a 
small part of U.S. trade with Europe) could prove disastrous for this trade.8 
McKinley would have to confront the Cuban crisis from the very beginning of 
his presidency. The trouble in Cuba had already taken a heavy toll on American 
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businesses and farmers that owned property on the island. The Spanish-American Light 
Company, which represented a consolidation of five gas and electric companies in Cuba, 
reported in December of 1896 that the war had halted all revenues from Havana and 
interest payments to bondholders would have to be suspended.9  American sugar and 
tobacco plantation owners suffered an even worse fate as they helplessly watched Cuban 
rebels torch thousands of acres of crops as part of their “slash and burn’ policy of 
defeating the Spanish army.  Among President McKinley’s backers, John D. Rockefeller 
had probably lost the most in the Cuban crisis.  The oil baron owned a multi-million 
dollar iron mine near Santiago Cuba but due to the prolonged warfare all production had 
to be halted.10  Against this background, business leaders generally believed that the 
Spanish government was better equipped to protect American property and ensure a 
return to the status quo in Cuba.  In this regards, McKinley concurred. 
In the days before entering the White House, McKinley busied himself with 
carefully choosing pro-business men to fill his cabinet.  Hanna was considered for 
Secretary of the Treasury but the Ohio businessman made it clear he preferred a seat in 
the Senate.  Bowing to this desire, McKinley appointed Ohio Senator, John Sherman to 
Secretary of State in order to create a vacancy for Hanna to fill. The Ohio legislature 
took this cue from McKinley and promptly elected Hanna to fill the remainder of 
Sherman’s term as Ohio Senator.  This blatant act of political cronyism caused much 
consternation among McKinley’s opponents and provided an endless source of mockery 
of the new administration.  Newspapers portrayed Hanna as a puppet master with 
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McKinley dangling at the end of the strings.11  Democrats in Congress jokingly called 
the president “McHanna,” and referred to the president’s policies as “Hannaism.”12 One 
Senator scornfully asked “If McKinley should die, would Hanna still be President?”13  
McKinley, who had a good sense of humor, took this criticism in stride.  He had been a 
Washington insider for almost twenty-five years and knew how the game of politics was 
played.   
After taking office, the newly-elected president made clear his intentions of 
keeping the United States out of a war with Spain.  In his inaugural address, McKinley, 
like so many presidents before him, reiterated the isolationist theme of Washington’ 
farewell address; “We have cherished the policy of non-intervention with affairs of 
foreign governments wisely inaugurated by Washington, keeping ourselves free from 
entanglements, either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them the 
settlement of their own domestic concerns…War should never be engaged upon until 
every agency of peace has failed…” 14 
To implement this policy, McKinley surrounded himself with like-minded 
congressional leaders; most of whom were wealthy businessmen.  In addition to 
Hanna, other influential members of this “Millionaire’s Club,” would be Senator 
Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island and Senator Stephen B. Elkins of West Virginia. 
McKinley’s vice president, Garret Hobart of New Jersey was also a prominent 
industrialist and had been hand-picked by Hanna to serve the pro-business 
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administration.15  In the House of Representatives, Speaker Thomas B. Reed 
(ridiculed by Democrats as “Czar Reed”) would become McKinley’s most loyal 
supporter.  These Republican leaders exerted pressure on the rest of their party to 
abandon all talk of war with Spain.  This new agenda was adopted by the 
Republican ranks and afterwards there was a dramatic change in the congressional 
proceedings.  Republican congressmen, who once delivered long eloquent 
speeches on the necessity of intervening in Cuba became conspicuously silent. 
Even the most vocal expansionists in congress such as Henry Cabot Lodge and 
William P. Frye softened their rhetoric and became more willing to pursue 
peace.16 The Republican leadership in both houses of Congress also blocked 
resolutions or debates concerning the Cuban issue. This Republican about-face 
would become a major source of partisan bickering in the months ahead.   
 Congressional Democrats and Populists were opposed to the McKinley 
Administration’s pursuit of peace with Spain from the beginning. These leaders were not 
about to surrender the Cuban issue that had been so carefully nurtured for their own 
political purposes. If Republicans insisted on non-intervention, they would be held to 
account politically for betraying the Cubans for their own selfish reasons.  Throughout 
the long debate preceding the Spanish-American War the public was constantly 
reminded of how the Republicans reversed their policy of supporting the Cuban 
rebellion.  “Before the election the Republican Party is Dr. Jekyll, and after the election 
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Mr. Hyde,” Nebraska Populist William L. Greene joked to members of the House.17 
Arkansas Democratic Congressman Hugh Dinsmore similarly mocked the Republicans 
for changing their position: 
  
Where now is the clarion voice of my distinguished colleague on the committee, 
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Wm. Alden Smith), whose fervid, eloquent 
appeals stirred the souls of us all? What has become of my other colleague, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Adams), who fairly fattened the Record with 
reasons, in the last Congress, why we should recognize the belligerent rights of 
Cuba… Will he tell us now that his argument was sophistry, his position 
unsound? 18 
  
The nation’s newspapers also noted the change in sentiment among the 
Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee who were now backing away 
from provoking Spain and blocking any forwarded resolutions to give the Cuban 
insurgents belligerency status.  In December of 1896, the New York Times reported; 
“Members of that committee who at the last session were radical in their opposition to 
Spain and bubbling over with enthusiasm for the Cuban patriots have changed front 
since their return to Washington and are now among the most conservative men on the 
committee.”19   
Several Republicans defended their change in position by claiming that the 
incoming McKinley Administration should not be confronted by such a serious 
international dilemma upon entering the White House.  They believed it important for 
McKinley to evaluate the situation and formulate his own Cuban policy. Other 
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Republicans declared that the time for the United States to intervene in Cuba had passed.  
Arguing that American commerce on the island had all but been destroyed, a member of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee assessed the situation, “If we had intervened a year 
ago… American property rights in the island would have suffered only a partial 
interference.  Today, as I say, the island is bankrupt, and its trade will be worth nothing 
to the United States for twenty years.”20 
 Throughout the rest of 1897 and into 1898 the Democrats and Populists became 
ever more hawkish on the prospect of war with Spain.  Their strategy was to paint the 
worst possible portrait of the atrocities in Cuba and then blame the unsympathetic 
Republicans for conspiring with the Spaniards and ignoring the will of the American 
people.  Republicans were accused of being hired traitors, cowards, unpatriotic and 
mindless slaves to their master McKinley.  One Democratic Congressman even ridiculed 
Republicans for worshiping Benedict Arnold as their patron saint.21 With acerbic 
hyperbole, Democrats blamed the Republicans for enabling the Spaniards to continue 
the extermination of the Cubans unhindered.  In some of the most vitriolic rhetoric, the 
Spanish military’s actions in Cuba were declared to be “more fiendish and devilish than 
have blackened the pages of history since the days of Caligula.”22 Another Congressman 
declared that Cuba was worse than Dante’s “inner recess of hell.”23 These colorful 
tirades were designed to antagonize the Republicans as well as provide titillating 
episodes for the newspapers to cover. 
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Democrats also criticized Republicans for being in the pocket of big business or 
financiers. Democrats such as Congressman Cyrus A. Sulloway made outrageous claims 
that the big European money interests controlled the Republican Party.   Sulloway 
contended that the House of Rothschild owned two-hundred million dollars in Cuban 
bonds and should Cuba achieve her independence these bonds would depreciate in 
value, hence; “Rothschild controls (J.P.) Morgan, Morgan controls Hanna and Hanna 
controls McKinley, the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of Representatives.  
Hanna is America and America is Hanna.”24  Democratic Congressman Hugh A. 
Dinsmore likewise blamed Republicans’ allegiance to big business as the reason for 
their unwillingness to intervene in Cuba; “True to your political obligations, you are 
unanimous in your support of trusts, syndicates, and organized capital. You are still true 
in your devotion to protecting the organized manufactures of this country.”25   
Congressman Jerry Simpson, a Populist from Kansas, argued that both 
Republicans and Democrats were controlled by business interests.  Simpson claimed that 
Cleveland had prevented a war with Spain because he and his administration were the 
agents, “of the bond-holding interests of the country and the 400,000,000 of bonds that 
Spain has issued to carry on the Cuban war … the Republican Party will follow in the 
same line of action.”26   
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In response to such attacks on Republicans, business leaders criticized the 
Democrats and Populists in Congress for playing politics with the Cuban crisis. Writing 
in the New York Times, businessman Abraham Miller accused Democrats and Populists 
of trying to embroil the United States in a foreign war to unite the people around an 
external issue.  He specifically targeted the Populists for pushing for war because “A 
foreign war would more surely than anything else enable them to compass their ends… 
and quickly send us to a silver basis.”27 
Convinced that exploiting the Cuban crisis was becoming a winning strategy, 
Democrats such as New York Congressman William Sulzer compared the Cuban 
insurgents’ struggle against Spain with the United States’ own war for independence.  
To loud applause from the Democrats present in the House, he proclaimed that his party 
was on the right side of history; “The Democrats in this House are in favor of passing a 
joint resolution granting belligerent rights to the Cubans.  The Republicans have 
persistently refused to permit a vote on the question.  The people of this country will 
hold the Republican party responsible for that action at the coming election.”28 
Republican Representative Robert Adams took the floor to question the patriotism of the 
Democrats who were aggravating a foreign crisis to win seats in the House; “I look 
hopefully forward to the day when our foreign policy will be national and permanent in 
its character and not subject to party strife.”29 
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  Several Republicans conceded that ignoring the Cuban situation posed a grave 
political danger in upcoming elections.  Kentucky Republican Representative David G. 
Colson cautioned his colleagues; “I say if we do not terminate this unholy warfare [in 
Cuba] I expect to see the next House of Representatives have in it many faces that we do 
not see here today…”30  Colson’s fellow Kentuckian, Democratic Congressman Albert 
S. Berry agreed that Republicans would be punished by the electorate if they failed to 
liberate Cuba and openly bragged, “I think the Republicans are on the run… the 
handwriting on the wall indicates that in the very next election they will find themselves 
in the minority in this country.”31 Democrats present in Congress laughed and applauded 
Berry’s braggadocio.  In response to this taunting, Republican Congressman Henry U. 
Johnson of Indiana warned the Democrats they were playing a dangerous game with 
America’s foreign policy; “I wish it were possible that gentlemen could take a broader 
view of this subject [the Cuban civil war] than merely to consider it as something upon 
which they may hope to obtain a partisan advantage.”32  Later in the debate, Johnson 
bolstered his criticism of Democratic demagoguery by reading an article from the 
Washington Post that described the Democrats as “…a thoughtless and hot-headed 
minority… that was creating a movement for war that was … clothed in the alluring 
garb of altruism and paraded as a noble effort of benevolence. But its moaning is war.  
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Its only possible result is carnage, barbarism, disaster…[the] war cry is inspired more by 
partisan ardor than by intelligent conviction.”33 
This scathing article in the Washington Post had stated the obvious about 
Democrats’ effort to wrap themselves in the American flag. It is important to consider 
that these legislators, who were mainly from the South, demanded freedom for the Afro-
Cubans, while they denied their own black neighbors basic civil and human rights.  For 
example, Alabama Democratic Senator John T. Morgan, a former Brigadier General in 
the Confederate Army and self-proclaimed white separatist, led the Senate in its crusade 
to liberate Cuba.  While serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Morgan had cried crocodile tears for the oppressed Cubans and submitted 
several resolutions granting belligerent rights to the insurgents. But concerning civil 
rights in the United States, Morgan supported repealing the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution that prevented voting rights based on race.34 
Similarly, South Carolina Democratic Senator, (“Pitchfork”) Benjamin Tillman, 
who supported American intervention on behalf of the Cuban insurgency, was largely 
responsible for his own state’s Jim Crow laws.35  As Tillman proudly proclaimed in 
1900; "We have done our level best [to prevent blacks from voting]... we have scratched 
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our heads to find out how we could eliminate the last one of them. We stuffed ballot 
boxes. We shot them… We are not ashamed of it."36   
Missouri Democratic Congressman David de Armond is another glaring example 
of this hypocrisy.  In his own pursuit of the job as Speaker of the House, De Armond 
was one of the most outspoken supporters of a war with Spain.  He was a demagogue 
who bitterly attacked the Republicans for betraying the suffering Cuban people (See 
page 52).  His long tirades in Congress were filled with platitudes for the “noble” and 
“courageous” Cuban people.  But on the day Congress passed the war resolution against 
Spain, he argued against giving rights to blacks in America on the basis they were 
“almost too ignorant to eat, scarcely wise enough to breathe, mere existing human 
machines.”37   
Republican Congressman Charles Boutelle of Maine, assailed these incongruent 
positions by pointing out that millions of black Americans were denied their “sacred 
rights” while Democrats insist we “…dash across the Gulf of Mexico and establish and 
maintain the independence and freedom of the insurgents in the island of Cuba.”38  The 
black community was equally skeptical of Congressional sympathy for Cuban rebels. 
Shortly after the war, a group of black citizens from Massachusetts wrote an open letter 
to McKinley expressing their indignation over the inconsistencies in American policy.  
This stinging indictment of both the Congress and McKinley questioned why the United 
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States would go to war over humanitarian reasons in Cuba while maintaining a 
“shameful silence,” on the violent conditions in the South.39 
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       Chapter Four 
                                     Run up to War 
 
Even though the Democrats kept up a steady attack on Republicans and 
McKinley, the President continued to work diligently for a peaceful settlement.  First, he 
sent former New York Republican Congressman Stewart L. Woodford to Madrid to 
serve as his minister.  Once in the Spanish capital, Woodford would become McKinley’s 
intermediary with the government and the Queen Regent María Cristina.1 McKinley’s 
instructions, as set forth in a letter from Secretary of State Sherman, were for Woodford 
to establish friendly contacts with the Spanish authorities and negotiate a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict whereby Cuba would be granted autonomy based on the 
Canadian model.  If the Spanish agreed, McKinley promised to likewise negotiate with 
the Cuban insurgents to accept these terms.2  McKinley realized that Woodford’s 
mission would be difficult considering the unyielding position the Conservative Spanish 
Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo had taken on the Cuban insurgency from 
the beginning.   
 But, as fate would have it, while en route to his new post, word reached 
Woodford that Prime Minister Cánovas del Castillo had been assassinated.3  Shortly 
afterwards, the Conservative government in Madrid collapsed and the Queen Regent 
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appointed a new Liberal Cabinet with Práxedes Mateo Sagasta as Prime Minister.4  
Making Woodford’s task easier, this new government was reform-minded and willing to 
grant Cuba a system of autonomy much like McKinley had suggested.  Beyond this, the 
new leaders also ordered General Weyler removed from his position in Cuba and 
replaced by a less repressive leader; General Ramon Blanco y Erenas.  After his arrival 
on the island, General Blanco instituted more humane policies toward the Cubans and 
quickly began to reverse Weyler’s severe reconcentration policy.5 
Through further negotiation Woodford was also able to secure the release of all 
American prisoners still held on the island. In a sign of goodwill, Spain even initiated 
talks on a new reciprocal trade agreement with the United States and Cuba.  Taking 
advantage of the new-found cooperation among the two nations, McKinley requested 
that Spain allow the United States to ship food and medicine to the starving Cuban 
citizens. After some heated debate among Spanish leaders, McKinley’s plan was finally 
accepted and the Spanish officials even helped distribute the supplies.6  By the end of 
1897, Spanish-American relations were, on all accounts, improving remarkably.  
Through McKinley’s skills as a politician and the luck of an assassin’s bullet, war at last 
seemed avoidable. 
 On December 6, 1897, McKinley submitted to Congress a report on the 
diplomatic progress being made between Spain and the United States.7   Loyal 
Republicans in congress such as Pennsylvania Congressman Robert Adams touted these 
successes; “Within sixty days of the time that the Republican President took his seat, the 
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doors of the dungeon of Cuba were flung open…Spain has responded to these friendly 
demands of this government in every particular.  Weyler was recalled…the 
reconcentrados have been gradually returned to their homes.”8   
Republicans also argued that since Spain was in the process of complying with 
all of McKinley’s demands it would be imprudent for America to take a more belligerent 
stance toward Cuba.  Democrats, on the other hand, complained that McKinley could 
not take any credit for the positive changes occurring in Cuba.  They insisted that the 
only reasons for a glimmer of hope on the island were the result of the assassination of 
Prime Minister Cánovas del Castillo and Spain was growing worried that the Untied 
States would soon take action in Cuba.  Congressman Dinsmore bragged that it was 
actually the Democratic Party’s leadership on the Cuban issue that had forced Spain to 
the negotiating table; “They saw that every organized body in the United States almost 
had expressed its sympathy for the Cuban patriots and demanded intervention on the 
part of this Government.”9 The Democrats also argued that the Cubans themselves had 
not been a party in the negotiations with Spain and would not fully accept the 
conditions. Moreover, they derided McKinley for betraying the Cubans for a lucrative 
trade deal with the Spaniards.  In reality, the Democrats were correct that the reforms 
would have limited success. The Cuban rebels publicly announced their rejection of 
“autonomy” and vowed to continue the struggle for nothing short of total 
independence.10  
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 This issue of reforms in Cuba was equally as divisive among the two major 
Spanish political factions.  Conservative members of the military in Havana were upset 
by General Weyler’s recall and began staging riots.  After several days of 
demonstrations, they attacked and burned down a pro-Sagasta newspaper office.  
Fearing that this escalation in violence threatened American citizens living in Havana, 
McKinley accepted Cuba’s Council General Fitzhugh Lee’s recommendation and sent 
the battleship USS Maine to Havana harbor.11  McKinley hoped that this show of force 
would calm the situation in Havana and would also placate congressmen who were 
demanding some action on the President’s part.  This action, however, backfired when 
Democrats decided to use this as another opportunity to ridicule the President.  
Congressman de Armond sarcastically asked Congress; “Is she [the USS Maine] there to 
vindicate our manhood, to protect American citizens, to proclaim what is in the hearts of 
the brave people of this country- sympathy for the struggling Cubans and detestation and 
horror over the outrages perpetrated upon them? Oh, no!... her visit is merely a 
resumption of friendly relations… in token of American humility and Spanish 
condescension!”12   
Other Democrats expressed the belief that McKinley had a more nefarious 
reason to send the USS Maine to Havana.  In a long harangue against McKinley, 
Democratic Congressman Robert W. Miers of Indiana claimed the battleship’s real 
mission in Cuba was to prop up the weak Spanish government by assisting the Spanish 
military in oppressing the rebels.  Miers concluded his speech by accusing the 
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Republicans of conspiring with America’s sworn enemy: “The Stars and Stripes are 
waving above the walls of Morro Castle [in Havana] not as a promise of liberty for 
Cuba, but as a refuge for Blanco and the other officers of the Spanish Court…Is this the 
way the Republican party keeps its promises?  While Nero fiddles Rome burns.”13 
Despite the Democrats’ accusations of collusion with the enemy and the vitriolic 
call for intervention in Cuba, McKinley was still optimistic about finding a peaceful 
settlement. The President had good reason to believe his efforts for peace were finding a 
receptive audience in the American public. George M. Cortelyou, McKinley’s secretary, 
reported that in the months leading up to the war; “90 percent of the mail coming to the 
White House had supported the President’s pacific course.”14   
The majority of citizens who wrote McKinley did express their confidence in his 
wise leadership in such a troublesome time. Civil War veterans complimented the 
president in resisting the martial spirit that aroused those younger Americans who had 
never experienced the horrors of war.  Business leaders openly worried about the impact 
a war would have on the flow of commerce. Ohio Banker and Former Speaker of the 
House Joseph Warren Keifer cautioned McKinley; “The expense of such a war would be 
beyond calculation…All business interests would be suddenly deranged.”15    
Religious leaders and peace organizations also praised McKinley for his 
determination in avoiding a conflict.  The Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia 
extended their best wishes to McKinley and invited him to speak in an upcoming 
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meeting.16 Other letters to the White House spoke of the political motivations of those 
behind the war movement. A “Mr. Dodger” warned McKinley that his political enemies 
would use the situation in Cuba against him regardless of what action the president took; 
“Those very people, who, for no just cause, would push our country into the unknown, 
would, as soon as they felt the distress that war brings and see its cruelty, be the first to 
denounce the Administration and everyone connected with the bringing on of the war.”17  
The letters that opposed McKinley’s pacific stance usually argued for war on the 
basis of humanitarian concerns and the nations’ honor.  Although these letters were 
respectful for the most part, several warned McKinley of disregarding those who desired 
intervention in Cuba in favor of the business community.  Charles Henderson of New 
York City expressed his thoughts to the president; “I trust, as a humble citizen, that your 
cabinet will turn a deaf ear to the representatives of the great banking syndicates and 
corporations who are reported to be offering suggestions in regards to a settlement of the 
Cuban question… the people of our great country will not allow it for a moment.”18 
Sitting aside the Cuban question, McKinley spent the first month of 1898 
attending to other matters of state.  In January the president and Mrs. McKinley 
filled their schedule with receptions and dinner parties; hosting a record number 
of guests. 19  Late in the month, McKinley traveled to New York City to address 
the National Association of Manufacturers at their third –annual convention.20  
McKinley made no mention of the Cuban situation during his long oration but did 
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assure the businessmen he was in “full accord” with their various domestic and 
international goals.21  
On February 1, President McKinley hosted a diner for foreign diplomats at 
the White House.  The event was an elaborate affair, attended by representatives 
of thirty foreign nations and their wives along with other government officials.  
Adhering to proper protocol, McKinley stood before the guests seated at the long 
table and toasted international cooperation and peace among the nations of the 
world.  The Spanish Ambassador, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, sat four chairs down 
the table on McKinley’s right.22 
If McKinley believed his efforts to avoid a war with Spain had been successful 
two events in February of 1898 were about to shake his confidence.  The first event 
occurred on February 9, 1898, when a private letter written by Spanish Ambassador 
Enrique Dupuy de Lôme to the Foreign Minister of Spain in Havana, Don Jose 
Canelejas, was intercepted.  In this letter, de Lôme caustically ridiculed McKinley and 
Spanish-American relations.  Stolen by a member of the Cuban Junta, the letter was 
quickly translated into English and sent to the major newspapers for its propaganda 
value. The insulting language in the letter criticized McKinley for being “weak” and a 
“would-be politician.”  Even more damaging, the letter described the proposed Cuban 
autonomy as simply a means of diverting American attention from Spanish to Cuban 
officials.23  While most newspapers waited to verify the authenticity, Hearst’s Journal 
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printed it the following day with the headline, “The Worst Insult to the United States in 
its History.”24  
 As could be expected, McKinley was upset at this affront to his character and 
called a special Cabinet meeting to discuss his administration’s options in dealing with 
this crisis.  After a lengthy meeting, McKinley sent a message to Spain calling for the 
recall of de Lôme and an apology.  Spain quickly consented to his wishes, but the 
damage had been done.  The New York Times ran de Lôme’s letter on the front page the 
next day and spoke of the outrage felt by many Americans and congressmen who were 
offended by the slanderous attack on McKinley.25  It is important to note that 
McKinley’s opponents in Congress had openly used many of the same or worse 
criticisms against the President. 
 Only a week after this scandalous news triggered public indignation, an even 
more devastating news story splashed across the nation’s headlines.  On the night of 
February 15, the USS Maine blew up in Havana Harbor killing two hundred and sixty 
six sailors.  The headlines in the majority of American newspapers were remarkably 
restrained in their account of the events.  Most did not mention the possibility of Spanish 
involvement.  The Wall Street Journal reported that “the Spanish army and navy officers 
are rendering every assistance” to the Maine sailors.26 Pulitzer’s World commended 
Spanish sailors who “worked like heroes to save the few struggling Maine men now 
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recovering in Ambrosio Hospital.”27  Other newspapers likewise avoided leveling blame 
at Spain and instead cited the probability of a coal bunker igniting the fire.28   
The mood in Congress was initially sober and subdued as well.  Bi-partisan 
resolutions were offered in the Senate calling for an inquiry into the explosion.  Debate 
centered on who was responsible for directing the investigation and what role the 
Committee on Naval Affairs played in setting the guidelines for the report.  A cautious 
McKinley reported to waiting reporters at the White House that the Maine explosion 
was “probably an accident.” He then asked Americans for patience while an 
investigation team would be sent to Havana to search the wreckage for the cause of the 
explosion. 29 
 While the nation held its breath waiting for the results of the inquiry, another 
event provoked public outcry for intervention in Cuba.  On March 17, 1898, Republican 
Senator Redfield Proctor from Vermont arrived in Washington with a long-awaited 
report on conditions in Cuba.   Proctor, a well-respected former Secretary of War and 
successful businessman, had announced some weeks earlier that he was going to take an 
extensive tour of Cuba to ascertain the true conditions of the people.  Proctor’s fact-
finding mission was important to the public as well as lawmakers, because of his 
credibility.  The Senator had previously been against any American intervention, so it 
was anticipated that his findings would be free of any biases that had plagued similar 
reports.30  From the day Proctor landed, newspaper reporters followed his journey 
around the island.  American newspapers ran daily stories on Proctor’s visits to the 
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homes of Spanish and American officials, refugee camps, military prisons, relief depots 
and orphanages run by the Red Cross.  Even though the media reported on the 
conditions the Senator encountered, Proctor himself refrained from making any 
observations until he could address the Senate. 31  
 After Proctor returned to Florida, he made his way back to Washington by train 
refusing any comments to reporters. Upon his arrival on March 17, he proceeded 
directly to Capitol Hill and interrupted the usual proceedings on the Senate floor.  As 
Proctor approached the podium, every Senator in Congress was present and attentively 
waiting. In an authoritative and dispassionate manner, Proctor meticulously laid out the 
hard facts on the horrendous conditions that existed on the island.  He admitted that 
when he left for his visit he did not believe the sensational news reports but was now 
convinced they were correct or worse.  In his description, Proctor spoke of thousands of 
emaciated women and children dying of starvation and disease.  The remaining 
insurgents on the island, he said, were still stubbornly holding out for independence.  
More importantly, he proclaimed the war to be a bloody stalemate that only outside 
intervention could end. 32  Proctor’s account of the desperate situation in Cuba had a 
profound effect on many who had heretofore resisted American intervention.  Many in 
the business and religious communities, which had consistently opposed war, were 
finally persuaded by Proctor’s speech.33  
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 Soon after Proctor’s speech the old Senator shared a buggy ride to Capitol Hill 
with fellow West Virginia Republican Senator Stephen B. Elkins. As a former Secretary 
of War, Elkins was conversant in foreign policy issues. On the way, Elkins praised the 
respected statesman on his speech and told him that he had “stirred the country as it 
never has been stirred.”  Elkins continued to praise Proctor’s speech as a powerful and 
colorful presentation not unlike that of the commentaries of Julius Caesar and the 
memoirs of Grant.  But honest to his anti-war convictions, Elkins admitted to Proctor 
that he felt the speech was mischievous and dangerous.  Elkins told him that he had 
“taken a great responsibility and done great harm.”34  
A few days later the Navy’s report on the Maine explosion arrived. The Navy 
investigators had decided that it was an external explosion that had caused the 
destruction.35 Coming on the heels of Proctor’s report to Congress, the timing could not 
have been worse.  Many Americans immediately suspected the explosion was a 
deliberate torpedo attack by the Spanish Navy.  McKinley, knowing what the 
ramifications of this report would be, met with members from all political parties and 
asked them for patience while his administration continued to pursue a diplomatic 
solution.  Most in Congress, including Republicans who had supported McKinley from 
the start, knew that war was now inevitable.  Several Republicans met with McKinley to 
warn him that their party would suffer a huge defeat in November if he did not act soon.  
On April 1, the New York Times reported that 200 Republicans had defected from 
McKinley and were now ready to vote for war.  In the same article, House Speaker 
Thomas Reed responded to a governor’s plea to dissuade the Republican defection; “He 
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might as well ask me to stand out in the middle of a Kansas waste and dissuade a 
cyclone.”36 Lacking options, McKinley finally agreed to draft a message that would ask 
Congress for the authority to use the military and naval forces as might be necessary to 
secure peace and a stable government in Cuba.  
McKinley, however, delayed sending the message to Congress while he made 
one last-ditch effort to solve the crisis diplomatically.  First, through Spanish Minister 
Stewart Woodford, McKinley urged the Spanish government to declare an armistice in 
Cuba, promise the people “full self-government, with reasonable indemnity,” and accept 
American arbitration.37 Secondly and clandestinely, McKinley sent word to the Vatican, 
via Saint Paul, Minnesota Archbishop, John Ireland, that he was willing to have Pope 
Leo XIII mediate an end to the crisis.  To avoid public and congressional awareness and 
condemnation of these negotiations, McKinley drafted Senator Stephen B. Elkins to 
conduct negotiations with all parties. 38 
 Senator Elkins was well suited for this task. In becoming one of the most 
successful businessmen in the country, Elkins had excelled in the art of compromise and 
gentle (and not so gentle) arm twisting.  He had brought these skills to the Senate where 
he was known for his political prowess.39  In addition, Elkins was personally acquainted 
with Archbishop Ireland, the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Polo de Barnabé, and 
members of the Cuban Junta.  The Archbishop was equally important in these 
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negotiations because not only was he the Pope’s surrogate but according to Elkins, a 
loyal Republican and “had more influence with the Administration than any other 
church authority in the United States.”40  
 On the morning of April 3, Elkins arranged for a three-way meeting between 
himself, Archbishop Ireland and Spanish Minister Polo at the Elkins’ residence in 
Washington.  After the usual exchange of courtesies, Elkins and Ireland began to 
emphatically present the dilemma facing Spain.  They warned Polo that Congress alone 
now had the power to declare war on Spain and was poised to do so.  The two men 
explained that the only avenue left for Spain was to declare an immediate armistice in 
Cuba.  Polo balked at this suggestion and maintained that if his country took this course 
of action it would be considered a concession to the insurgents and would sacrifice 
Spain’s dignity. The debate continued back and forth until the three surrogates agreed to 
propose a temporary armistice lasting six months.  The Archbishop left Elkins’ house to 
send a dispatch to the Pope while Polo sent word to his government on the terms of the 
meeting.41 
 That afternoon Elkins visited the White House to inform McKinley of the 
proposed armistice.  The Senator also held discussions with Assistant Secretary of State 
William Rufus Day.42  When Elkins returned home he received word from Ireland that 
the Pope was pleased with the turn of events.  The Pope also explained that he had 
telegraphed directly to the Queen Regent to encourage her influence to support the 
proposed armistice.  Archbishop Ireland also told Elkins that he had discussed the 
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situation with French Ambassador Jules Cambon.  The Ambassador promised Ireland he 
would have an “earnest” talk with the Spanish Minister about granting an armistice and 
also send a letter to the French government requesting they bring all possible pressure to 
bear on Spain.  Elkins reported this progress to a “good-spirited” McKinley and his 
cabinet in a secret meeting.  McKinley also wished to relay this information to the 
Cuban Junta to ascertain if they would agree to these measures.  Acting as a go-between, 
Elkins promised the President he would meet with the Cuban Junta the following day.43 
 But that night around midnight a message from the White House was sent to 
Elkins asking him to come see the President immediately.  The President had received a 
message from Minister Stewart Woodford in Madrid suggesting that Spain was seriously 
considering granting an armistice with the condition that the United States withdraw 
their fleet from Key West, Florida.  McKinley was adamantly opposed to any suggestion 
of removing the navy from Cuban waters.  He knew that it would be political suicide if 
he made such an enormous concession to Spain as Congress would pounce on any sign 
of weakness.  Word was sent back to Woodford that the United States’ Navy would have 
to remain in Key West.44 
The next morning, as promised, Elkins meet with an American Cuban Junta 
spokesman, Col. John J. McCook. Elkins bluntly told McCook that he appreciated the 
Cuban cause but it was impossible for the rebels to win Cuban recognition through war.  
Elkins explained that if war was declared on Spain the United States would insist on 
taking Cuba and Puerto Rico as a war indemnity.  The only way for the rebels to achieve 
Cuban recognition, Elkins continued, was for the Spanish and Cuban rebels to agree to 
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an armistice and then work for recognition through peaceful channels.  McCook did not 
agree with Elkins but said he would discuss the matter with other representatives of the 
Junta.45 
On April 5, Elkins received word that his three-way negotiations with 
Archbishop Ireland and Spanish Minister Polo may have bore some fruit.  The Pope had 
cabled the Archbishop a copy of a dispatch he received from the Queen Regent in which 
she signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Pontificate.  In the message, the Queen 
Regent told the Pope she had “confided the honor of the Armies of Spain into his hands” 
and “would consent to an armistice.” Elkins and the Archbishop understood this to mean 
the Spanish Crown was willing to let the Vatican negotiate a peaceful deal but Elkins 
needed official confirmation through the Spanish Minister.  Elkins realized the Spanish 
government may hold a different opinion than the Queen Regent and the deal to grant an 
armistice may come with untenable conditions.46 
Waiting for word from Madrid, Elkins went to the Senate to make the case to his 
fellow Senators why it was important to avoid granting recognition of Cuban 
independence.  He explained to his colleagues that the Cubans had not earned their 
independence and if the United States was forced to go to war on account of the rebels 
America should keep Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to help pay war costs. 
Thereupon, he met with President McKinley and told him that members of the Senate 
were coming around to this idea.  Later in the day, Elkins met once again with the Junta 
representative McCook and warned him that time was running out.  Elkins reiterated the 
need for the rebels to accept an armistice and failing that, the United States would annex 
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Cuba and the island would be “lost to the insurgents forever.”  McCook reacted angrily 
to this threat and called McKinley “almost cruel” for wanting to deny the struggling 
people of Cuba their liberty.47 
For several days after, Elkins traveled back and forth between the White House, 
the Archbishop’s residence, the Spanish Minister’s office and the Senate trying to broker 
a peaceful conclusion to the Cuban crisis.  On April 7, McKinley told Elkins that the 
Spanish cabinet was fighting among themselves and that the proposed armistice had 
been scrapped.  Elkins then conferred with Archbishop Ireland on Spain’s stubbornness 
and the decision was made to turn up the pressure on the Spanish Minister.  The 
Archbishop visited Minister Polo later that day and gave him the most unadorned threat 
yet delivered.  Ireland warned Polo that if his government failed to seek peace the 
United States would not only take Spain’s honor they would also take Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, the Philippines and bombard Barcelona.  And after this humiliation; “…the Jewish 
bondholders would simply devour Spain.”  In taking his leave from Polo, the 
Archbishop promised that if the Spanish failed to give the Cubans an armistice Spain 
would cease to be a nation.48 
The situation in Madrid was likewise becoming more agitated.  The Pope had 
renewed his pressure on the Spanish government to suspend hostilities in Cuba and the 
Spanish Cabinet hotly debated what action to take.  During one closed session of 
discussion, the American Minister, Woodford grew impatient and interrupted the 
meeting with a message that criticized the Spanish Cabinet members for delaying and 
asked them to make a final decision within six hours.  This unpardonable act of 
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indiscretion on the part of Woodford sent the Spanish government into a fury.  They 
issued a condemnation of Woodford’s action and brought all deliberations to a sudden 
halt.  Elkins noted in his journal that; “it was too bad war might turn upon so 
insignificant a thing.”49 
During these final negotiations, Congress was becoming increasingly impatient 
for action.  Several Democrats declared that it was now the sole responsibility of 
Congress to declare war and President McKinley’s position was irrelevant.50   
Republican voices were also now heard loudly among the war cries. In a letter to the 
president, Henry Cabot Lodge described the growing martial spirit among his 
constituency and grimly predicted “if the war in Cuba drags on through the summer with 
nothing done we should go down in the greatest defeat ever known before the cry ‘Why 
have you not settled the Cuban question?’”51  
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      Chapter Five  
                                  Decision for War 
 
Without any measure of success on the diplomatic front and faced with the threat 
of Congress taking the initiative on the Cuban issue, McKinley finally submitted his 
Declaration of War to Congress on April 11, 1898.  This lengthy and legalistic document 
requested the authority to use the military to bring hostilities in Cuba to a close but did 
not exclude a peaceful resolution if possible. Conciliatory in tone, McKinley’s message 
began by describing the intolerable conditions that existed in Cuba and addressed the 
adverse effects the ongoing hostilities were causing to American trade and investors.  He 
spoke of the aroused emotions of the American people and legislators that interfered 
with his administration’s advancement of domestic concerns. He meticulously listed the 
numerous diplomatic attempts that were made to solve the crisis peacefully.1   
The war message also extended sympathy to the Cuban people but asserted that 
they would not be given a recognition of independence. The president considered 
recognition of Cuban independence as unnecessary for American intervention and 
unwarranted under international law.  He also warned that recognition of any particular 
government in Cuba might subject the United States to embarrassing conditions of 
international obligation and “In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the 
approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its 
direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.” McKinley feared that 
if sovereignty were granted, American forces in Cuba would come under the jurisdiction 
                                                 
1 McKinley’s Message to Congress, 11 April 1898, in Foreign Relations, 1898, 760. 
 67
of the rebel commanders and the United States would lose the ability to demand 
reparations for damaged American property and investments that had occurred during 
the war.   Instead, American forces would intervene only as a neutral power in order to 
terminate hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and allow for the 
establishment of a new government. 2 
McKinley’s war message handed the responsibility of further action against 
Spain over to the legislative body; “The issue is now with Congress…I have exhausted 
every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors… I await 
your action.” In conclusion, McKinley offered one last bit of hope that peace could be 
achieved without military intervention.  He reported that the day before he had finally 
received information that the Queen Regent of Spain had ordered General Blanco to 
suspend all hostilities on the island.  He recommended that Congress give this royal 
decree solemn consideration in their deliberations and added; “If this measure attains a 
successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be 
realized.”3 
Initial reactions to McKinley’s message were, as to be expected, mostly divided 
among party lines.  The majority of Republicans embraced the message as a thoughtfully 
constructed statement that demonstrated the president’s statesmanship. “I consider it a 
strong and patriotic utterance, fully covering the whole question and justifying the 
confidence of the people of the United States everywhere have in the executive,”  
declared Iowa Republican Senator Jonathan Dolliver.  Continuing, he suggested that 
members of Congress should accept McKinley’s recommendations.    In concurrence, 
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Senator Elkins told reporters that McKinley had made the case admirably and assured 
them that the people of America and Congress would indeed sustain the message.  
Illinois Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Shelby M. Cullom, 
agreed with Elkins that the President’s words would carry great influence but suggested 
that the Senate may go further than he had recommended.4  
Leaders of the opposition parties were unimpressed with McKinley’s message 
and responded angrily.  Their primary criticism centered around the president’s failure 
to declare Cuba’s independence or call for immediate armed intervention on behalf of 
the Cubans.  Moreover, they derided the message as intentionally confusing and offering 
more problems than solutions.5 Missouri Democrat Congressman Alex M. Dockery 
ridiculed the message as anemic and “suggestive only of vague, uncertain, and hesitating 
policies.” South Carolina Democrat Benjamin Tillman called it “illogical and 
inadequate.”   Kansas Populist Congressman Jerry Simpson claimed that the message 
was “weak and vacillating” and a reflection of the man who gave it.  He also declared 
that McKinley’s proposal was humiliating and would go down in history as having 
deprived America of her manhood and love of freedom. 6 
Representatives of the Cuban Junta were equally disappointed in the President’s 
message. Official spokesmen for the organization refused to openly discuss the matter, 
but off the record expressed disgust with the implications of the message.  Unidentified 
Junta members vented to reporters that the McKinley administration had walked into a 
diplomatic trap set by the Spaniards.  The Junta members reasoned that since Spain had 
agreed to a suspension of hostilities, McKinley would be restrained from taking any 
                                                 
4  “Comment On The Message,” New York Times. 12 April 1898,  p. 2. 
5 “An Angry Congress,” New York Times. 12 April 1898. p. 1 
6 “Comment On The Message,” New York Times. 12 April 1898,  p. 2. 
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military action against them.  However, since McKinley’s message had called for 
forcible intervention to constrain both sides in the conflict, the American guns would 
now be aimed at the insurgents.  McKinley had effectively aligned the United States 
with Spain and the Cubans would continue their fight for independence regardless of 
who the enemy was.  The Junta also warned that if indeed the American military took 
action against the Cubans, it would be the “death knell” for the McKinley administration 
and the Republican Party.7  Evidently, the Junta believed the majority of Americans 
were sympathetic to the Cuban cause and if McKinley waged war on the rebels, the 
American electorate would hold the president and his party responsible in the next 
election. 
Across the Atlantic, Spain had a very different interpretation of McKinley’s war 
message.  Sagasta’s government considered the message an insult to Spain’s dignity and 
issued an official statement that repudiated the United States’ claim to have legal 
authority to intervene in Spanish territory.  The Madrid periodical El Correo argued that 
Washington’s “lamentations over Cuban misfortunes” were hypocritical since the 
American people and members of government were responsible for supporting the 
rebels and thus prolonging the war.  The Conservative Party organ, El Epoca assailed 
McKinley for ignoring Spanish sacrifices made in agreeing to a cease fire.  El lleraldo 
de Madrid went even further in their condemnation of McKinley, announcing that the 
message had revealed that the United States was the true enemy and “the author of the 
war, who has taken advantage of the honesty of Spanish diplomats…”  The paper went 
on to declare that all diplomatic avenues were now closed and predicted that America 
                                                 
7 “Views of Junta Members,” New York Times. 12 April 1898,  p. 2. 
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would pay dearly for its blunder.8  Another Madrid paper, El Imparcial urged the people 
to unite and demand the navy be sent immediately to Cuban waters. Spanish citizens 
crowded the streets in patriotic demonstrations in Barcelona and Valencia shouting; 
“Long Live Spain!” Long live the army!” Long live Cuba!” 9  On April 13, Spanish 
Minister Woodford telegraphed Secretary Sherman that American citizens were coming 
into various consulates seeking transportation out of the country and asked for 
instructions on how to deal with them.10 
If McKinley had hoped his message would bring Spain and Cuba to the 
negotiating table he was mistaken.  The threat of military action against the Spanish 
military and non-recognition of the insurgents only succeeded in inflaming the situation. 
The Sagasta government and the Queen Regent understood that the Spanish public 
would not tolerate additional humiliating concessions.  A military defeat at the hand of 
the United States would be more honorable and politically viable than either losing to 
Cuban rebels or sheepishly accepting America’s terms.   The Cubans, for their part, were 
as recalcitrant as ever in their demand for complete independence; too much blood had 
been shed to settle for less.  Besides, McKinley’s message still had to go through 
Congress before the official policy on Cuba was formalized and the insurgents had many 
allies in Washington. 
It is also possible that McKinley had intentionally loaded his message with 
ambiguous language in order to set off a long drawn-out debate in Congress.  With 
Congressmen engaged in political warfare over the details of the message, McKinley’s 
administration could have some breathing room to solve the crisis peacefully.  Spanish 
                                                 
8 “Madrid Press Comments,” New York Times. 14 April 1898,  p. 1. 
9 “The Message In Madrid,” New York Times. 13 April 1898,  p. 3. 
10Woodford to Sherman. 13 April 1898, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, 760.  
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Minister Woodford floated the idea of a Cuban plebiscite and American diplomats began 
putting a proposal together but time was running out.  Both Woodford and the Secretary 
of the Navy, John D. Long expressed their belief that with more time McKinley could 
have broke the impasse without bloodshed.11 
However, in all likelihood the President knew that war was now unavoidable and 
hoped that calling for war would unite a divided country and lessen partisan bickering. 
McKinley was also relieved to finally pass the burden onto Congress.  The last months 
had been agonizing for McKinley. He had suffered public ridicule through personal 
letters, opinion columns and cartoons lampooning him as weak and a coward.  In 
demonstrations, rowdy crowds had even burned his likeness in effigy.12 Some in the 
business community still urged him to resist war but the list of his supporters was daily 
growing shorter. Those around him commented on the dark mood that enveloped the 
president and noticed the “haggard” look on his aging face.  During a musical program 
being held in the White House in late March, McKinley had retired to a back room 
where he sat on a sofa and burst into tears. In an unusually candid conversation, 
McKinley confessed to journalist H.H. Kohlsaat that the constant political attacks were 
causing him sleepless nights and physical strain.13   On the day the message was 
delivered to Congress, an exhausted McKinley enjoyed his first evening of genuine 
                                                 
11 John L Offner, An Unwanted War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
1992), 190. 
12 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. (New York, N.Y.: 
Random House, 1989), 96. 
13Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley  (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),  pp. 
181-182., Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. (New York, N.Y.: 
Random House, 1989), 98. 
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relaxation in weeks surrounded by several personal friends who kept their conversation 
“purely social.”14 
In Congress, McKinley’s message was acted on quickly.  On April 13, the 
Republican-chaired Foreign Affairs Committee brought to the full House a joint 
resolution that closely adhered to McKinley’s recommendations.  The resolution 
authorized the President to use the military in Cuba but did not preclude non-military 
intervention.  It also did not recognize either a Cuban Republic or independence for the 
Cuban people.  But before the resolution could be read an argument erupted over the 
time allotted for debating the measure. The President’s supporters in the House feared 
this final round of debates would provide the opposition with the opportunity to deliver 
lengthy harangues against McKinley and the Republicans. So accordingly, they limited 
the debate to forty minutes. Democrats bristled over this parliamentary maneuver and 
interrupted the proceedings to press for an extension of the debate.  Texas Democrat 
Joseph Bailey arose in protest and requested that a Democratic substitute resolution be 
read. This minority resolution was similar to the one proposed except it recognized the 
“Republic of Cuba” and demanded the president to immediately send  the United States’ 
military to remove Spanish forces.  Speaker of the House Reed denied the motion amid 
boisterous cries of protests from the Democrats.  Excited by the rowdy Democrats 
cheering him on, Bailey loudly exclaimed; “The Chair is trying to force the minority..,” 
before his voice was drowned out by Speaker Reed’s gavel and shouts of “regular 
order!”15 
                                                 
14 “The President Much Relieved,” New York Times. 12 April 1898. 
15 “Blows Averted in the House,” New York Times. 14 April 1898, p.2. 
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This was the final straw for the frustrated Democrats. They rose en masse to 
demand their voices be heard.  James Richardson of Tennessee shouted “They [the 
Republicans] are simply playing for political advantage and the people of the country 
ought to know it!”  The Republicans responded in kind and the opposing parties began 
shouting remonstrations at each other across the aisle.  The verbal jousting soon turned 
violent when a Republican, Charles Brumm accused Democrat Franklin Bartlett of being 
a liar.  The latter picked up a large bound copy of the Congressional Record and hurled 
it at his accuser.  The two antagonists lunged at each other and chaos ensued.  Members 
of each side collided in the middle of the room as they struggled to hold back the 
combatants. Women seated in the galleries screamed as innocent bystanders scrambled 
to escape the melee.  A government employee caught in the middle of the confusion was 
knocked down from a blow to his jaw.  Banging his gavel, Speaker Reed ordered the 
Sergeant of Arms, to restore order. Fearing for their safety, the House Rules Committee 
retired for a special meeting to reconsider the parameters of the debate: thus ended the 
first attempt to pass a resolution on the president’s message.16 Faced with the most 
critical question confronting the American people since the Civil War, congressmen 
resorted to slinging insults and fists to resolve their differences. 
The House Rules Committee returned minutes later and each side was allowed to 
offer their resolutions and debate their positions.  Debate on the resolutions was on par 
with the many preceding confrontations in Congress over the Cuban situation.  
Republicans defended their position of pursuing every possibility of peace before war 
was declared.  Cuban recognition was argued against on legal grounds and the 
Democratic Party was chastised for exploiting a national crisis to score political points.  
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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Speaking for the other side, the leading Democratic member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Hugh A. Dinsmore commented in a reflective tone that he regretted the 
manifestation of partisanship that had occurred earlier.  “If there was ever a period in the 
history of this government when patriotic dignity should have been shown and 
partisanship should have been subordinated to statesmanship that period is now,”  he 
declared before a prolonged round of applause.  Having prefaced his speech with praise 
for bi-partisanship, Dinsmore proceeded to blame the hesitating policies of the majority 
party for the death of the sailors on board the USS Maine. Speeches by other Democrats 
in the House continued the narrative that McKinley and his supporters were responsible 
for the tragedy in Havana harbor and the continued suffering of innocent Cubans. 
The acting chairman of the committee, Republican Robert Adams closed the 
debate by calling for unity among all members of the House regardless of party 
affiliation.  He touted the Republican-sponsored resolution as sufficient to ensure 
America’s Christian duty toward the Cubans and maintain the nation’s honor. In 
conclusion he appealed to the House; “that one and all rise in their places and cast their 
votes to show the world… that however we differ on matters of detail, we are Americans 
one and all, and that politics cease at the seacoast.”  The minority resolution was voted 
on first and defeated by 191 nays to 148 yeas.  The majority resolution was then offered 
and despite the many voices that had ridiculed it earlier it easily passed by 325 yeas to 
19 nays, with 12 members not voting.17  
                                                 
17 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1898, 31, pt.3: 3817-3821. 
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In the Senate, the deliberations on McKinley’s message were less dramatic if no 
less partisan.18 The debate in the upper chamber lasted four days with thirty Senators 
speaking on several resolutions.  In the end, the resolution they passed by a 51 to 37 
margin, was similar to the House version except it included the Turpie-Foraker 
Amendment that recognized the “Republic of Cuba” and the Teller Amendment that 
disclaimed any American imperialist design on Cuba.19 Although most Republicans 
opposed the bill because of these two amendments, eleven of them defected to the other 
side. The House initially rejected the Senate resolution outright as well, but through a 
compromise the Turpie-Foraker Amendment was dropped and the Teller amendment 
adopted. 
Shortly afterward the resolution was signed by McKinley, an ultimatum that 
required Spain to vacate Cuba was hand carried by Secretary of State Day to the Spanish 
Ambassador.  With war unavoidable, McKinley’s administration favored taking swift 
and decisive actions against Spain.  Previously instructed by McKinley, war planners 
from the Naval Academy had completed a contingency plan which included attacking 
the Spanish navy in the Caribbean as well as in the Pacific. Like Cuba, the Philippine 
islands were also engaged in an insurrection against the Spanish and American 
intervention would be needed to end the hostilities. On April 21, McKinley ordered a 
blockade of all Cuban ports and on April 24, Commodore George Dewey, commander 
                                                 
18 There was one minor incident where Congressman Money called Congressman Wellington a 
liar. However, Money quickly apologized and the tension was diffused. 
19 U.S., Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1898, 31, pt.3: 3988-3993., This 
amendment named after its author Senator Henry Moore Teller, a Silver Republican from 
Colorado more specifically stated,“ The United States of America hereby disclaims any 
disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for 
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people." 
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of the Asiatic squadron, was ordered to proceed to the Philippines to destroy the Spanish 
fleet.20  
 The prospect of war was an exciting enterprise for the American nation.  Treated 
as a sort of coming of age party, thousands of men and women, from nearly every 
section and demographic of the United States, clamored to offer their services for the 
war effort.  Newspapers reported that Southerners were ready to stand shoulder to 
shoulder with their former Northern foes in defense of their now-united country.  Recent 
immigrants to America, likewise, declared their eagerness to prove their loyalty to their 
new home on the battlefield.21  Similarly patriotic, 10,000 African-Americans 
volunteered and were formed into all-black units.22  Even, Annie Oakley, of Buffalo 
Bill’s Wild West Show fame, wrote McKinley a letter offering to form a company of fifty 
women sharpshooters to fight Spain.23 
 Many politicians were anxious to join the action as well. Theodore Roosevelt 
resigned from his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and formed his own regiment, 
the “Rough Riders.”24  Not to be outdone, William Jennings Bryan organized his own 
regiment of Nebraskan volunteers and headed for Florida to wait for transportation to 
Cuba.25  In an effort to heal Civil War wounds, President McKinley appointed several 
ex-Confederate officers to lead the United States’ Army.  One of these newly-appointed 
                                                 
20 Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley  (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),  pp. 
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21 “Volunteer Reserve Rush,” New York Times. 24 April 1898, p. 1. 
22 Donald H. Dyal, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish American War (Westport, CT.: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996), p. 43. 
23“Letter to President William McKinley from Annie Oakley,” (300369) [Electronic Records]; 
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Generals was the sixty-one year old Alabama Congressman Joseph Wheeler.26 
Obviously, the McKinley administration maintained a tight control over who was 
allowed to participate in the war.  McKinley, the perennial politician, understood well 
the danger of offering his political enemies the chance to win hero status in a war: Bryan 
spent the war on the coast of Florida commanding a makeshift army camp. 
 The war itself was a quick lopsided victory for the United States.  The first battle 
of the war took place in Manila Bay, where Commodore Dewey’s fleet defeated a 
Spanish squadron in a matter of hours (Apparently, word of this action was the first time 
many in Congress had heard of the Navy’s intention of conducting operations in the 
Pacific) .27 In the Caribbean theatre of war, the American forces had similar successes. 
Besides some stiff resistance by the Spanish in Cuba, and almost no resistance in Puerto 
Rico, the war was over in 113 days.28  Afterwards, the United States had acquired an 
extensive overseas empire. On December 10, 1898, representatives of the United States 
and the Spanish government met to sign the Treaty of Paris, which required Spain to 
finally relinquish sovereignty over Cuba.  The treaty also ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and 
(for $20 million dollars) the Philippines to the United States for guardianship.29  
 Although American members of the peace delegation agreed to the treaty, 
ratification by a two-thirds margin in the U.S. Senate was required to bring the treaty 
into law. Obtaining Democratic support for this treaty would prove a difficult task for 
                                                 
26 Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley  (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),  
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the McKinley administration in the months ahead.  McKinley believed that keeping the 
islands would benefit both the United States and the native inhabitants.  Concerning the 
Philippines, McKinley sought the advice of John Forman, who was the leading Filipino 
authority at the time.  Forman warned that the Filipinos were divided along racial lines 
and that if the country were abandoned it would descend into chaos and bloodshed.  
McKinley also realized that other countries would likely intervene if America left.  
Germany had already been negotiating with Spain to purchase the Philippines; in this 
regard, on June 12, a German squadron under Admiral Otto von Diederichs had arrived 
in Manila harbor.30 
  The debate in the Senate on ratification of the treaty also focused mainly on the 
annexation of the Philippines. Despite the unifying, nationalistic event of victory in war, 
partisan division remained intense.  These heated exchanges among the Democrats and 
Republicans revealed that the parties were as divided as ever.  Democrats once again 
argued against the treaty on racial grounds.  Senator Tillman summed up their ideology 
shortly after the vote in February of 1899, “…with five exceptions every man in this 
Chamber who has had to deal with the colored race in this country voted against the 
ratification of the treaty.  It was not because we are Democrats, but because we 
understand and realize what it is to have two races side by side that can not mix or 
mingle without deterioration and injury to both and the ultimate destruction of the 
civilization of the higher.”31  It is ironic that the Democratic congressmen who pushed 
                                                 
30 Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley  (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),  325-
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the hardest for war with Spain now protested the loudest against the American 
expansion that resulted.  
  All but two of the Republican Senators supported the treaty.  Their stated 
reasons for ratification varied.  Some declared it was now America’s responsibility to 
bring democracy and education to these suppressed people.  Others discussed the 
economic benefits of an overseas empire for the United States and the islands’ 
inhabitants.  Others argued that America’s reputation as a world power was at stake. The 
two Republican Senators who voted against the treaty, George Hoar and Eugene Hale, 
argued that this form of imperialism was against American principles. Hoar warned his 
colleagues in the Senate, “This Treaty will make us a vulgar, commonplace empire, 
controlling subject races and vassal states, in which one class must forever rule and 
other classes must forever obey.”32   
 As the vote on the treaty approached, McKinley’s Republican allies in the Senate 
worked overtime buttonholing Democrat members and making cloakroom deals for their 
vote.  Nonetheless, a preliminary headcount revealed that the treaty was still four or five 
votes short of ratification.  McKinley, however, found support from an unlikely source.  
Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan visited the capitol shortly before the vote 
and urged his supporters to vote for the treaty.  In Bryan’s truly Machiavellian scheme, 
he planned on using anti-imperialism as a campaign issue in the next presidential 
election.33  The treaty was approved on February 6, 1899 by a vote of 57 to 27; only one 
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vote more than the two-thirds majority required.34 Once again, politics had played a 
crucial role in shaping America’s foreign policy. 
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  Conclusion  
 
In the final analysis, the road to the “splendid little war” of 1898 was paved with 
politics.  Beginning with an unpopular Cleveland presidency and an unprecedented 
economic crisis, congressmen found it advantageous to redirect the voter’s anger toward 
Spanish atrocities in Cuba.  Once McKinley came into office, and persuaded the jingoes 
in his own party to abandon the war cry, the Cuban issue became bitterly partisan.  In 
this poisoned environment, there was no chance for an honest debate on the issue.  
Exagerated rhetoric by irresponsible politicians forced the United States ever closer to 
war and made any diplomatic solution impossible.  President McKinley at first tried for 
a negotiated end to the Cuban dispute.  However, as the options for ending the dispute 
peacefully proved ineffective, McKinley chose to declare war.  The President thought a 
declaration of war (and war itself) would curtail partisan division in Congress but that 
did not prove to be the case. 
All political parties had played a game of political expediency that accelerated 
the U.S. entrance into global affairs and would set the stage for further conflicts in the 
twentieth century.  As unprecedented as this episode in American history was, it was not 
to be an isolated incident. Throughout the twentieth century, American foreign policy 
continued to be framed by partisan politics.  From the First World War to the Cold War, 
American politicians have exploited or even aggravated foreign dilemmas for partisan or 
personal gain.  The celebrated tradition of politics ending “at the water’s edge” is more 
of a myth than reality. As America enters the twenty-first century and faces new 
challenges from abroad, the political parties are as divided and indisposed to cooperation 
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as ever. Hopefully in the future, American politicians can put aside their ambitions to 
serve the best interests of the nation. 
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